How to learn thinking for yourself I
– the performative trick of Kant´s method

One important aspect of Immanuel Kant´s famous formula, that Enlightenment is man´s emergence from his self-inflicted immaturity,[1] is his statement that the latter is self-inflicted. If this is true, it concludes that it is up to ourselves to change this state of immaturity. And indeed: Kant assumes that this is our own fault and that thus it is up to ourselves to change this certain kind of immaturity. According to him, this certain kind of immaturity, thus that we are immature and need guidance by others, is due to the fact that we refuse thinking for ourselves. By thinking for ourselves he means: thinking independently, that is independent of guidance by somebody else. In Kant, everything connected to the topic of immature not-thinking-for-ourselves is expressed by metaphorical descriptions of living in slavery or by the image of a farm animal, such as when he speaks of the `yoke´ of heteronomous thought.[2]

However, is his programmatic call for change, for leaving situations of enslaved thought, not contradictious? After all, to become an independent-minded human, I must already be capable, at least as a first step, of thinking for myself – otherwise I would not have any desire or will to change a situation of intellectual immaturity. On the other hand, if I am already capable of this, I cannot have been in a state of immature incapability of thinking for myself.

The answer to this difficulty is:  having a sense of my intellect being in a state which is basically determined by others and not by myself is due to my reason as a potential not completely being aware of questions of self-determination, and also otherwise I need not to have performed many thoughts or intellectual achievements which, however, are, as a capability, an essential element of the skills of human life as such.

Now then, it is necessary to initiate the implementation of that what is potentially inherent as one´s own self-determination. This initiating is a particular educational achievement to which we will have to return. Initiating comes along with the concerned individual no longer refusing to think for him/herself. Thus, if the individual is capable of giving up on this refusal – how is he/she supposed to do so? And if he/she is not yet capable of thinking for him/herself – how is he/she supposed to learn how to do so, and who is supposed to teach him/her? Kant remarks: `Es ist also für jeden einzelnen Menschen schwer, sich aus der ihm beinahe zur Natur gewordenen Unmündigkeit herauszuarbeiten. Er hat sie sogar lieb gewonnen und ist vor der Hand wirklich unfähig, sich seines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen, weil man ihm niemals den Versuch davon machen ließ.´[3]

If he/she shakes off his/her fetters, still he/she would just be able to `über den schmalsten Graben einen nur unsicheren Sprung thun, weil er zu dergleichen freier Bewegung nicht gewöhnt ist. Daher giebt es nur Wenige, denen es gelungen ist, durch eigene Bearbeitung ihres Geistes sich aus der Unmündigkeit heraus zu wickeln und dennoch einen sicheren Gang zu thun“.[4]

Thus, to become an enlightened human, step by step certain skills must be cultivated and supported. In a programmatic essay of 1765 Kant expreses this by way of classical educational elaborations and, in the common psychological language of his time, has it his way: „[...] da der natürliche Fortschritt der menschlichen Erkenntniß dieser ist, daß sich zuerst der Verstand ausbildet, indem er durch Erfahrung zu anschauenden Urtheilen und durch diese zu Begriffen gelangt, daß darauf diese Begriffe in Verhältniß mit ihren Gründen und Folgen durch Vernunft und endlich in einem wohlgeordneten Ganzen vermittelst der Wissenschaft erkannt werden, so wird die Unterweisung eben denselben Weg zu nehmen haben. Von einem Lehrer wird also erwartet, daß er an seinem Zuhörer erstlich den verständigen, dann den vernünftigen Mann und endlich den Gelehrten bilde.“[5]

According to Kant, for such a cultivating way of teaching a number of things must be taken into consideration, among others some measures must be taken which can already be found in Bacon´s Novum Organum[6], who warns us that the path from observing nature to certain conclusions must very be divided very exactly into the smallest steps, to not over-hastily arrive at interpretations and theories which, after all, might turn out to be unjustified. Kant transfers this advice on the methods of the teacher: „Die Regel des Verhaltens ist also diese: zuvörderst den Verstand zu zeitigen und seinen Wachsthum zu beschleunigen, indem man ihn in Erfahrungsurtheilen übt und auf dasjenige achtsam macht, was ihm die verglichene Empfindungen seiner Sinne lehren könne. Von diesen Urtheilen oder Begriffen soll er zu den höheren und entlegnern keinen kühnen Schwung unternehmen, sondern dahin durch den natürlichen und gebähnten Fußsteig der niedrigern Begriffe gelangen, die ihn allgemach weiter führen; alles aber derjenigen Verstandesfähigkeit gemäß, welche die vorhergehende Übung in ihm nothwendig hat hervorbringen müssen, und nicht nach derjenigen, die der Lehrer an sich selbst wahrnimmt, oder wahrzunehmen glaubt, und die er auch bein seinem Zuhörer fälschlich voraussetzt. Kurz, er soll nicht Gedanken, sondern denken lernen; man soll ihn nicht tragen, sondern leiten, wenn man will, daß er in Zukunft von sich selbst zu gehen geschickt sein soll.“[7]

Things run parallel: both a child and a still unenlightened, that is immature, person as such must in this way learn how to think, by way of processes by way of which he/she will gradually arrive at more abstract judgements. Kant calls the thus appropriate way of teaching the research method, and it becomes „nur bei schon geübterer Vernunft in verschiedenen Stücken dogmatisch, d. i. entschieden“.[8]

The here implied distinction between learning and practicing is also confirmed and discussed in more detail in another treatise, i. e. in Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue (Second Part of The Metaphysics of Morals).[9] By way of learning in the sense of communicating textbook contents one acquires knowledge of these contents, however one will not necessarily learn how to think as such. By way of practicing, however, in the sense of asking questions and putting into question, in the context of which the answers are indeed not supposed to be given before the questions, one practices thinking in a way which implicates that, metaphorically speaking, one may watch oneself while thinking.

In Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue, this practicing is referred to cultivating certain forces which are inherent to man but whose capability may become obvious only by way of practicing and implementing. Oriented at the fact that humans have such talents is the good old Socratic, or maieutic, or also: erotematic, method, when `the teacher queries that what he wants to teach his disciples´.[10] Doing so, `durch Fragen den Gedankengang seines Lehrjüngers dadurch, daß er die Anlage zu gewissen Begriffen in demselben durch vorgelegte Fälle blos entwickelt, (er ist die Hebamme seiner Gedanken)´ the teacher acts as a guide; `the apprentice´, on the other hand,`becomes this way aware that he is capable of thinking for himself´.[11]

Thus, due to the students´ undeveloped horizon of thought and cognition, in many contexts it is the teacher who askes the questions. Also at the beginning of waking up from states of immaturity this cannot be different, as indeed with the students the state of immaturity is predominant.

Now, indeed we may pick many passages from Kant´s complete works which are on educational considerations. Also Rudolf Malter proceeds in this way, who, in 1981, published an essay on this topic: „Philosophieunterricht nach zetetischer Methode. Gedanken zur Didaktik der Philosophie im Ausgang von Kant“.[12] There, by way of distinguishing a kind of reason as such, which must be attributed to the human species, and a kind of reason which can be realised within the individual from the idea that mature thought consists of enabling (one´s own) reason to think spontaneously, and that is in the sense of the implementation or realisation of spontaneous thinking being only possible by way of the independently (autonomously) thinking individual. Of Kant´s works, Malter takes into consideration most of all the already mentioned Nachricht as well as excerpts from the methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Furthermore, it must be added, also Logic is of great interest, for there[13] indeed these theories are conclusively discussed, and it is also this work which introduces the topos of the `horizon of our insights´, which structures it into a logical, an aesthetic, and a practical horizon, and which discusses in how far the latter could and should be extended.[14]

Apart from the details of Kant´s elaborations on education, on learning and on extending one´s own horizon of insight, now it is impressive that in their entirety Kant´s printed works are an application of such a zetetic way of proceeding. As yet, this point has nowhere, neither in Malter nor anywhere else, been particularly appreciated. With this way of proceeding, Kant is the teacher and the readers are the students. When speaking of “students”, however, we must be careful: any reading of a work by Kant makes obvious that, for understanding it, the reader must meet some educational requirements. Obviously, his texts address the circle of philosophically informed people who are familiar with metaphysical concepts as well as logical tools and methods, which was rather limited in the 18^th century and is much wider in our days. That is, the readers of Kant´s works are scholarly people. In how far, then, can they be students?

Well, first of all this is no contradiction, as frequently it is a typical feature of scholarly people that they strive for gaining ever more insights and knowledge, being aware that each newly gained insight also always makes obvious how little one really knows (for the time being). Secondly, precisely with scholarly people it is sometimes urgent to irritate them, to stimulate a self-critical attitude: `Alles sceptische Polemisiren ist eigentlich nur wider den Dogmatiker gekehrt, der, ohne ein Mißtrauen auf seine ursprüngliche objective Principien zu setzen, d. i. ohne Critik gravitätisch seinen Gang fortsetzt, bloß um ihm das Concept zu verrücken und ihn zur Selbsterkenntniß zu bringen.´[15] Thirdly, in a way Kant´s readers must be mature students, or they must (be able to) see themselves as such. Kant is confident that they have the capability of, in the course of a complex process of reflecting about manifold philosophical positions, also reflecting about their own thought. Crucial for this is not their age, gender, origin or social status, indeed not even the age they live in – crucial is their frame of mind, and this must start out from indeed that Socratic I know that I know nothing. Such an attitude, however, may be easily shared both by Kant´s contemporaries and by today´s readers, and that is why his work may definitely be considered ageless. In its entirety, it is an instruction for `How to learn to philosophise and to think for oneself´.

Kant teaches both, by cultivating his readers´ intellectual capacity, after having made them aware of their own talents and after having stimulated their will to cultivate these talents. Awakening and stimulating refers to the fact that humans must be motivated to want to escape a state in which they are not yet, or only in a limited way, capable of independent thought. Subsequently, step by step the basic skills necessary for independent thought must be cultivated.

Kant teaches philosophising and thinking for oneself by way of guiding through a number of debates of the history of philosophy, this way demonstrating how to distinguish good from bad deductions, how to identify mistaken conclusions, and which methodical skills are required for prudently determining concepts and conceptual arrangements. In the course of this, frequently not only the readers´ knowledge of philosophical content is trained but, just the same, their knowledge of methodology. For, Kant stages the sequence of the steps of his reasoning as a dramaturgically and rhetorically well-planned overall composition, he integrates mystifications and irritations, and frequently he makes use of irony, of mockery and of satire. The philosophical mystifications are usually only solved in the later works; in this concern, all printed works are systematically contextualised with each other.

This overall context starts out, and this characterises most of all the first third of his entire work, from observations and conclusions as they are common with the philosophy of nature. Thus, the sequence of the individual texts of the complete body of works are in line with the above quoted recommendation, to at first train the intellect in the context of observing nature, so that it will be capable of adequately interpreting certain phenomena and to classify them according to an at least preliminary theory. Only then more demanding ideas, for which reason is responsible, may get a chance. As a preparation, in the early texts methodological issues are dealt with, by delimiting matter-of-fact and scientific ways of proceeding from those starting out from unclear concepts and un-philosophical assumptions and, without further ado, progressing to unscientific explanations.

Due to historicising the fact that Kant presents his steps of reasoning in different works, the previous tradition has failed with understanding the complete body of works as one, cohesive argument, which is why, for the time being, it has not been possible to acknowledge the complete body of works as an Enlightenment programme of self-learning.

In my opinion, among others this is due to the fact that two specific features of the orientation of Kant´s methodology have not been identified as such: by help of certain rhetorical and logical means the author aims at, firstly, the above sketched awakening of the awareness of an enslaved mind which, at the moment of waking up, becomes aware of certain circumstances and its desire to escape them, and by help of the same means the author aims at supporting the above mentioned activum of thinking and philosophising among his readers.

Here, the term methodology means: the author applies a method while at the same time teaching it in the course of applying it. As yet, this methodological trick of Kant´s entire work could not be identified because, as it is common with the research of Kant, the whole body of his works has been broken up into individual works which are denied to be the results of exact planning. Instead, one pursued the interpretation hypothesis that Kant had indeed lacked certain knowledge of natural philosophy and mathematics, that in his early texts he was, philosophically seen, still practicing, and that only gradually he had risen to the form and quality of his critical works. However, it is stated, even there we find lots of mistakes and inconsistencies which those interpreting him have not considered to be purposefully included and thus strategically-meant elements of an, after all, educational-methodical text structure but to be mistakes by the author himself.[16]

Now, how are we supposed to imagine strategically planned elements of an educational-methodical text structure which might effect an awakening of intellect and awareness, which might motivate the desire for independent thought, and which might support thinking for oneself and independent philosophising?

Now, these are indeed the hinted at ironical, mocking and satirical passages, the mistaken conclusions, pretentious assertions without any justification, presumptuous expressions promising content which cannot be justified at all, remarks which immediately contradict remarks made a few pages earlier, and very often it is insufficiently defined concepts adopted from other philosophical theories or even from unquestioned everyday use, which are sometimes contrasted to each other and, in the sense of expounding them, subtly caricatured, but are then, in the course of the further proceeding, profoundly analysed and, step by step, ever more exactly determined and defined.

By way of these strategic elements of an educational-methodological text structure Kant enriches his entire way of arguing in a way as to constantly challenge the readers, because they are incessantly asked for their judgement; now, is this or that passage to be taken seriously or not? Is this now a caricature of a concept or term and thus a critique, or is it sufficiently justified to make use of it for further considerations? Can this or that assertion be justified or is it completely absurd?

Paper does not blush, and many things are easily written down. Uncritical minds who believe everything without putting it into question and who dutifully note down everything they read, no matter what it is, are neither helpful for today´s societies nor are they helpful for spreading Enlightenment across the world.

Crucial for Kant´s method is that what is also crucial for any other learning process, that the readers of Kant´s works must remember what has been negotiated in earlier works (also: how it has been negotiated), and what have been the results. Not at all is it possible to receive any of Kant´s books or essays independently of the others, but one should start with the first work and step by step pursue his works as a whole; in case of questions occurring in the process, one must, if necessary, go back to earlier passages one perhaps does not remember well enough to get things straight, like with any common textbook. If one is completely baffled and is not capable of deciding if a certain passage is correct or wrong, if something is to be taken seriously or a mockery, one must be patient until one reads a  later one of Kant´s works where this problem is solved.

Kant himself intersperses his work with some remarks on the advantage of irritation and riddles, e. g.: „Aber überhaupt ist auch ein gewisser Grad des Räthselhaften in einer Schrift dem Leser nicht unwillkommen: weil ihm dadurch seine eigene Scharfsinnigkeit fühlbar wird, das Dunkele in klare Begriffe aufzulösen“.[17]

Thus, although each of Kant´s individual texts was separately bound and published at completely different times, all of them must be imagined to have been bound as one complete volume, as the elements of one, unique philosophy textbook which is grounded in a sceptical method and performatively teaches how to think and to think for oneself.

The learners are assumed to be provided with reason, common sense and a good memory, basic mathematical and physical skills, as well as a good understanding of the German language. In the 18^th century these requirements were met by university scholars, independent scholars, some theologians and representatives of the clergy, the educated nobility and the educated bourgeoisie. This means that the circle of those people taught how to think for themselves by Kant was not fully congruent with the students listening to Kant´s lectures (although of course there were overlaps). Both were told the same content, but the methods and the degree of terminological and conceptual exactness as well as references to the theories of others were fundamentally different.

In the following, excerpts from the way of proceeding in the programme of the complete body of works shall be presented, by way of which it may become obvious in which ways Kant invites to independent thought while at the same time teaching and supporting it.

To present this, at first it must be clarified what at all was the exact content of Kant´s teaching. Usually, teaching communicates topical knowledge: to get a driving licence, one learns everything necessary about traffic rules and the code of behaviour to be all set for driving; after having learned a language, one is able to speak and understand it; after having studied chemistry, one is familiar with the necessary terms, materials, formulas and experiments. Usually, in the course of such training processes neither the method of the subject is discussed nor is the method of learning reflected on.

Philosophy, however, is the discipline which inseparably communicates both: topical and methodical knowledge are crossed over there. The topical knowledge taught by Kant is in line with the respectively most recent knowledge of metaphysics and natural philosophy in the 18^th century – and what about the methodical knowledge? This the reader learns indirectly, in the course of reading, which is connected to frequently putting into question what is written there in cold print.

Both, however, would also be true if only thinking was supposed to be taught, that is if philosophy was the same as thinking but not as thinking for oneself. If the emphasis is on teaching both how to philosophise and how to think for oneself, the particular trick is teaching the students that in no case they shall have their thought influenced by an authority but to enable them to independently judge on what is topically taught. This, however, cannot at all be done by a textbook in the common sense.

Suitable for such a training (of independent thought) are dialectic ways of teaching as they were common with scholastic, and of course all philosophical dialogues are suitable which are abundantly presented by the tradition. There, topical doubts were distributed among certain dialogue partners, so that in the course of a scholastic debate or of reading a philosophical dialogue each pro and con is immediately comprehensible. However, this is not sufficient for really stimulating or supporting independent thought. Basically, this happens only when doubt is created and nourished. The active creation of deep philosophical doubt, which makes thinking for him/herself the focus of the reader´s attention, will be realised most impressively if, as a reader, one is confronted with one´s own convictions, or indeed that what one believes to have just been taught by the author is shaken by reading the text, without any immediate solution being available. In such a case, reading leads to aporia, into a dead-end; one does not really know how to go on and is forced to reach back to considerations of one´s own, as obviously one cannot expect much enlightenment from the author of this text, or at least one cannot expect to be provided with any immediate solution.

Only under this condition it is safe that the readers will not keep a certain distance – as it would be the case if e. g. they were watching other people thinking, for example in the course of philosophical dialogues – but that they are able to watch themselves, thus immediately starting to discuss their own considerations and learning. Raising this particular kind of awareness of one´s own reasoning power and then even keeping it alive, this, as I believe, is the high art of philosophical education and method.

Now, in Kant this awakening and supporting happens in the context of all possible subject matters of metaphysics and philosophy, and exemplarily discussing this in each single case would at first require information about many terms, and generally the problems of the respective theories would have to be explained. As due to lack of space this is not really possible here, I am going to focus on a realm where, from days of old, man´s thought has been kept in the dependence of authorities: that is the realm of religion. From this again I am going to basically just take the concept of God, to consider it within the context of its predominantly metaphysical function. In view of Kant, over the past two hundred years much has been written about this group of themes, however under the aspect or in the context of questions which are not really important for what has to be explained here.[18]

In the following I am going to attempt to sketch that and in which ways Kant, throughout his entire work, works on a philosophically profound deconstruction, by applying constantly sharpened, assessed concepts of what one believes to know about God and faith, as well as on disavowing the range of trust in the competence of religion or Church when it comes to guiding the individual´s life and providing it with orientation. Due to the fact that at Kant´s time authors had to struggle with censorship rigidly restricting their work, such a project could not just be bluntly written down. Instead, the chosen rhetorical means was: ambiguity. Simply because of this, in Kant the topical field of religion, in the widest sense, is suitable for sketching in how far the readers are motivated for emerging from immaturity and in how far their independent thought is supported.

One important idea by Kant is to be found already in an early text, although not many of his contemporaries caught sight of it: Nova dilucidatio, and this means: for reasons of logic we may claim something which must be thought, and this then we call God (`Vocatur Deus´).[19] The subsequent elaborations of this text are in line with those Kant formulates in his concluding final text[20] whose publication he would not live to see; both consonantly frame the project of making thought independent of religious authorities and arguments.

Stations of step-by-step working out his project are to be found in very many texts of Kant´s complete body of works; in the following just some of them will be referred to. After, in Nova dilucidatio, Kant had confronted – thus rejecting, after all – the idea of the self-causation (causa sui) of a superior or divine being with causation only being imaginable in the way that any cause must chronologically precede its effect and that thus, against the background of this chronological condition, any self-causation is self-contradictory,[21] in the essay Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels[22] he starts harmonising God and geometry, like also God and the laws of nature, with each other. Thus, one is already used o Kant basing his elaborations on a metaphysical-logical and not, in the strict sense, on a religious or Biblical concept of the superior being. Also, for the reader it is nothing new that he is disinclined to adopt certain theological contents connected to attributions such as almighty, omniscient, universally valid etc. After all, e. g. in Nova dilucidatio the trick is that argumentatively time is made superior to God.

In 1759 a short essay Über den Optimismus is published, where Kant, in view of the problems connected to the issue of theodicy and the debate on the best of all possible worlds, goes on with putting into question the matter-of-course nature of what is claimed concerning God. Right at the beginning Kant causes irritation, by way of a chain of logical conclusions in which not everything is as flawless as we might expect it from an author such as Kant. „Wenn keine Welt gedacht werden kann, über die sich nicht noch eine bessere denken ließe, so hat der höchste Verstand unmöglich die Erkenntniß aller möglichen Welten haben können; nun ist das letztere falsch, also auch das erstere. Die Richtigkeit des Obersatzes erhellt also: wenn ich es von einer jeden einzelnen Idee, die man sich nur von einer Welt machen mag, sagen kann, daß die Vorstellung einer noch bessern möglich sey, so kann dieses auch von allen Ideen der Welten im göttlichen Verstande gesagt werden; also sind bessere Welten möglich als alle, die so von Gott erkannt werden, und Gott hat nicht von allen möglichen Welten Kenntniß gehabt.“[23]

This shows several built-in mistakes. On the one hand, it is incorrect that from the consequens being wrong it concludes that the antecedens is also wrong; all that concludes is that on the whole the conclusion is dubious or wrong. Then there is the twofold mistake that the terms used in the sentences of the chain of conclusions are used in more than one sense (quaternion terminorum): on the one hand, he speaks of ideas existing within each respective reason, on the other hand he speaks of Erkenntniß or Kenntniß which must thus still be gained. Furthermore, some of these ideas refer to possible worlds, and this makes even the less logically trained reader ask: how are we supposed to have Erkenntniß of possible worlds?

The crucial idea of the syllogism presented by Kant is the statement that for every idea always also a relative one may be imagined which shows a higher degree of perfection. This, it says, is generally possible when it comes to ideas, that is even concerning ideas of the divine reason. Thus here, and once again this is kind of a trick, the term ` divine reason´ is meant as a locative definition and not – as otherwise common with treatises of the kind – as a particular logical definition of a superior (divine) rationality which is capable of thinking everything. This means: in terms of arguing, here the law of an endless iteration is made superior to Divine reason.

In this text Kant also goes on with caricaturing and thus problematizing certain matter-of-course statements on God, His highest degree of perfection and reality as well as on God having chosen the best possible world, as they are common in theology and metaphysics. This way he irritates the reader´s expectations and indirectly calls on putting common concepts and terms into question. In each of the here discussed texts this is done without any announcement. In Versuch über den Optimismus, just a few pages later there is the following, similarly clumsy conclusion: `Es gibt Größen, von denen sich keine denken läßt, daß nicht eine noch größere könne gedacht werden. Die größte unter allen Zahlen, die geschwindeste unter allen Bewegungen sind von dieser Art. Selbst der göttliche Verstand denkt sie nicht, denn sie sind, wie Leibniz anmerkt, betrügliche Begriffe (notiones deceptrices), von denen es scheint, daß man etwas durch sie denkt, die aber in der That nichts vorstellen.´[24] Also this time it is conspicuous for the reader, as far as he/she is provided with common sense, that the proposition that the divine reason does not think such infinitesimal entities is pure invention and not at all evidence-based, particularly when it comes to the reference to Leibniz. Here, such an unfounded assertion has certainly the additional function of criticising Leibniz´s theory.

For the here presented cases as well as, furthermore, for almost any other one of Kant´s texts it is indispensable to read them as carefully as possible and to be always attentive, for each sentence, each conclusion, each passage may reveal a meaning one would not expect if reading swiftly and superficially. Without Kant adding a kind of a task book with questions to his text, which might tell the reader to think the text through more thoroughly, to connect its contents to related problems and to work out ideas for possible solutions, still – at least in the best case – there results such a task book in the thinking reader´s mind or at least in the mind of any reader who is stimulated for independent thought. Even if reading a text does not produce any result in the sense of solutions for the presented problems, still the critical dissection of traditional concepts, of the reasons given to them, or of their claims, which usually come along with concepts, explanations and theories, is very useful. These are the first steps on the path towards learning how to think for oneself.

Also in the texts of his middle period Kant continues his educational programme of awakening and supporting the reader´s critical thought. The irritations one is confronted with in Critic der reinen Vernunft concern primarily definitions as well as justifications of the ways of intuition: space and time, in connection with attributing both to inward resp. outward meaning as well as with questions about their epistemological functions concerning the subjective or objective validity of insights.

Critic der praktischen Vernunft, however, presents further irritations concerning the concept of God, which are due to the fact that in each case they are based on the premise that God is the necessary creative cause, based on which, however, bizarre conclusions are drawn, because the terms used in the context of the other premises and preconditions remain either unexplained or insufficiently defined or because in earlier texts their meaning has been revealed to be at least dubious. For example the attributive definition of God, that he is `the cause also of the existence of substance´, is said to be necessary for the concept of God as the `being of all beings´; if we gave up on the former, we would also have to give up on God´s perfection and Allgenugsamkeit (aseity), which way basically all theology is said to come to its end.[25] The expression `existence of substance´ toys with certain claims in particular of Leibniz´s theory but is as such not at all explained or determined in any sufficient way.[26] Here, it is applied within the hypothetical consideration if our deliberate actions, based on practical reason, are due to God, but already the insufficient definition of the applied terms reveals the whole thing as being useless.[27] The next irritating assertion, which basically connects to the above sketched elaborations in Nova dilucidatio, is: God may be the cause of the existence of finite objects, but (being their cause) he could not be `die Ursache der Zeit (oder des Raums) selbst [...] (weil diese als nothwendige Bedingung a priori dem Daseyn der Dinge vorausgesetzt seyn muß), seine Causalität folglich in Ansehung der Existenz dieser Dinge selbst der Zeit nach bedingt seyn muß´.[28] Of course, the validity of these claims depends on what is understood by `hervorbringende[r] Ursache´. Quite without doubt, we may imagine that God created space and time, but then we cannot without applying further presuppositions imagine Him as an active cause in time. But we generally assume this later meaning when speaking of causing.

The conclusion to be drawn from these elaborations, to which we might add many more passages from Kant´s entire work, is: this complete body of works is indeed full of passages which (would have to) always make the thinking reader cry out loud with astonishment and incomprehension. It is so full of such passages that, in the course of coherent reading, one can no longer believe that these are single errors or mistakes by the author which have evaded correction.

Apart from such intellectually stimulating and matters-of-course-undermining passages, Kant also presents elements of his critical, transcendentally-philosophically grounded system of metaphysics which are without any trace of irony, thus which are not presented with any ambiguity or which cannot be meant differently from the way in which they present themselves at first sight. One of these theoretical pieces is that feature of God which, apart from the necessity of thought, is crucial in the context of Kant´s metaphysics: Allgenugsamkeit (aseity). It is introduced and discussed as a substitute for the idea of God´s perfection or eternity in Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes.[29]

The reader must learn how to distinguish between such philosophical concepts, which are genuinely Kant´s and which thus have been never before in this way, and the various kinds of caricature and discussion as well as dissection of unexplained concepts and exaggerated semantic claims traditional philosophical concepts and classifications come along with. For this capability of distinction Kant uses the term Urtheilskraft.

In Kant, many of these lessons on the cultivation of enlightened and progressive thought are laid out in such a way as to be read and thought through in a wider context, across quite a number of texts. For example, at the beginning of the last-mentioned text it says: `the most important one of our insights´ must be: `There is a God´.[30]

Step by step, however, in Kant´s various texts the claims connected to such statements are disavowed. Existence is no predicate, after all, so that, e. g. when it says `God is`, these are no reasonable and as such assessable statements. One should better have it this way: something exists, and certain features or predicates may justifiably be attributed to it, which in their entirety find expression by the word `God´.[31] But God cannot be imagined either spatially or chronologically at any place.[32] God cannot be the subject of experience, no statement on Him is theoretical knowledge or a theoretical insight.

As the subject of critical consideration, the thus addressed topic of proof for the existence of God runs through wide parts of Kant´s entire work, but here it cannot be discussed in more detail. On the whole Kant, after an exemplary assessment procedure which considered even the last-possible hypothetical argument, comes to this conclusion: at best, one could demand: each human must establish his/her own God, in the moral sense. Only man him/herself could make him/herself morally good; the highest thing one must strive for is wisdom and not God.[33] It is, Kant says, the synthesizing subject who imagines world and God and makes both congruent by imagining them. Nevertheless, he says, it is very useful to imagine the transcendence of the autonomy of pure reason in analogy to the transcendence of a divine being.[34]

Here, just a few examples from Kant´s complete works have been considered in detail, to make obvious in how far the author, by way of irritating the reader´s expectations and by help of strategically incorporated mistakes, of flawed expressions, of terminology, of the conclusions, makes the reader urge for considering these passages him/herself. Many other strategies of writing, most of all ironic or satirical passages, could not be discussed here.

Now, for a conclusion we must ask why at all Kant makes things so complicated in terms of rhetoric. Is there no other way of awakening from the state of immaturity, in which somebody thinks in a way predetermined by other people or by authorities, and is there no other way of creating the effect that one becomes aware of one´s own doubt and thought, and is there no other, more direct way of cultivating the capability of independent thought? For example, by help of side notes he would have been able to explain that and in how far there were conceptual difficulties here and there, that the terms used came from traditional theories and that obviously they would require assessment and questioning before, in good conscience, they could be used for the further course of consideration. The philosophical problems, he could have said, were as follows, to which he could have added a list to be thought through by the reader. He could have written down flawed or bizarre syllogisms as well as untenable claims, however while immediately adding remarks on their logical judgement. Just as well, the reader would have learned how to think independently in the course of such or similar ways of writing a text, would he not?

I would like to give this answer: on the one hand, it is more impressive and more sustainable if, in a way, one is fooled, misled or led up the garden path by the author of a text and has fallen into the trap. I am sure that an insight gained this way will be memorized more permanently and will be forgotten less easily (if at all).

Secondly, correlated teaching contents, such as in the form of a text to which the same or another author adds remarks and judgements are nothing else than textbooks. Concerning their contents and methods, these will always keep a certain distance from the learners; just like any teacher will always keep such a distance from the students, usually without being able to give up on keeping this distance, except for the price of losing his/her authority.

Thirdly, and thus I connect to what has been said above, about the efficacy of creating active doubt, to a certain degree it must be the learner him/herself who teaches him/herself how to think for him/herself. Initially, at least for quite some time, this is only possible under the guidance of a teacher, before the learner will be sufficiently trained to such a degree that independent thought, without being influenced by others, has become a habit, consequently before mastering it. But before this, part of this being taught how to think must be the learner´s own work, and this is made possible by making the learner think by aporiae and by making him/her doubt certain contents so much that there is no way around taking refuge with one´s own thought, without any outside influence.

If, fourthly, a person who has this way been trained with enlightened and independent thought will start enlightening others and, due to the fact that in the course of learning how to think for him/herself he/she has been provided with insight into the method of thinking for him/herself without being influenced by others, probably he/she will orient his/her own teaching methods accordingly. This way, the critical method of awakening and cultivating independent thought – thus basically: Enlightenment – could be used even in a distant future, and it could be prevented that someday the philosophy of Enlightenment would itself degenerate into some (then only historical) content in the context of a dogmatic way of teaching philosophy.

Translation: Mirko Wittwar