Is the Sceptical Method Capable of System?
On Method in Kant and Plato

At the heart of sceptical methods, as I understand them, there is always, in the theory-constitutive sense, a game of questions and answers. For a start, this quality suffices for distinguishing sceptical-philosophical texts from those applying other methods.

Certainly, all philosophical texts give answers to questions. However, in most cases these questions have only an indirect function – they may serve as the starting point for the subject under analysis. Thus, their appearance is already over when the text is being formulated. For when it comes to method, most philosophical texts aim, in view of this questions-and-answers structure, at overcoming the questions and at presenting the answers as the achievement of overcoming them. If one is successful, there is no need any more to mention the questions again – they have been solved. In philosophy, if one intends to present a useful theory or system, it is better to finish, that is: overcome, not just questions but all doubts at all. At least this is the modern basic conviction since radical doubts have allegedly been overcome by Descartes´ Cogito ergo sum.

Now, of course, the doubt slips back in again through the backdoor, only not necessarily as a radical doubt but as dwarfed doubt; often there are indeed some hundreds of dwarfed doubts. Every time somebody presents a theory, has a certain basic idea and attempts to safeguard it by help of arguments, there will be someone who objects or doubts the quality and suitability or the way of justifying the arguments.

This means: it may be that the questions have been solved by way of one´s answers, however this only holds for the horizon of one´s own convictions, of one´s own scope of concepts and arguments as well as, of course, for one´s own method. But it may be that somebody else pursues quite a different approach, but even he or she can only attempt to deal with, that is: to solve, philosophical questions in their each respective way.

Now, there are two ways of preserving philosophical questions in the context of a theory and most of all in the context of presenting a theory, in their function as questions staying questions and not being supposed to be solved and eliminated once and for all by way of an answer: the first one is the rhetoric conception in the form of dialogues or treatises showing a high degree of mockery and satire, the second one is the critical method as presented by Kant. What I would like to emphasize for both is the fact that it is not about eliminating philosophical doubts but that in each case doubts are supposed to be constitutive elements even of presenting a theory. However, of course such presentations, such as in the case of Kant, are not about putting really everything into question while not giving any real answer to any problem – no: of course answers are found and assessed, and in the further course of the proceeding some of them will not need any further critical assessment or, to have it more exactly: they will not need any further critical assessment concerning certain aspects, but concerning certain other aspects they definitely will.

In view of philosophical dialogues, however, different forms must be distinguished. The Platonic form is clearly a form for which it is true that the questions and answers are an elementary part of the presentation. A protagonist is in charge of asking and asking again, other characters give answers, often in a way which is supposed to make clear that up to then they have not considered the addressed issue. Thus, the reader watches them during considering and the inquirer or author, on the other hand, during his prudent and purposeful composition of the course of the dialogue.

The Aristotelian form of the dialogue, as it is found particularly in treatises from the Early Modern Age, such as in Galilei, Henry Moore, Descartes, Hume, Berkeley and others, rather represents a way of attributing certain convictions, sometimes including suitable pseudonyms, to the dialogue partners. The readers watch the protagonists during their dispute, and topically this is often based on presuppositions and certain philosophical positions which are frequently shaken, thus nourishing doubt. In terms of dramaturgy, however, frequently stronger and weaker positions are provided for, sometimes one of the dialogue partners is presented as a real fool whose contributions are eaten alive by the opponents. That is: although questions to the dialogue partner are of course an element of the dispute, the dialogue, it is about presenting positions of different strength by contrasting them to each other, in a way as to demonstrate the quality of the arguments. And also there a good argument is meant to destroy doubt and make any further question obsolete.

One may state that the tradition of philosophy is divided: when it comes to theory building and method, some prefer an orientation at dogmas, laws, axioms and giving reason to reasons. One is convinced of the suitability of one´s own method and is quite certain that, given a sufficiently precise way of proceeding, certainty concerning the subject is not only attempted but indeed achieved.

Others, in contrast to this, never stop discussing and putting into question the appropriateness of their way of proceeding. There, the investigation of theoretical results happens mostly in a two-pronged way, by at the same time referring to the subject and also to the method, which always also means that basically the aspect of self-criticism is frequently integrated. It is my claim, now, that this happens in the most effective and prudent way in texts with an ambiguous structure, i. e. which work by way of rhetorical tricks and, for example, at certain passages include an idea which will undermine the reader´s certainties.

This may perhaps be illustrated by the example of `Alice in Wonderland´. Usually `Alice in Wonderland´ is filed under nonsense literature. Does that mean that this book is completely nonsensical? Of course not. After all, it is crucial that that the `nonsensical´ becomes convincing only due to being connected to the meaningful, thus that e. g. the reader knows about common proportions and gravitational conditions, that he/she must have basic logical skills, for otherwise the toying with paradoxes and the contrast between `meaningfulness´ and `nonsense´ would not work at all. Obviously I must know within which contexts or mind-sets a consideration makes sense and another one does not. By way of frequently changing these concepts of validity, some of these philosophical texts and some of these nonsense texts create an awareness of a certain logical multi-dimensionality. Moreover, nonsense texts toy with the readers and their expectations and this way lift them up to eye level. This is precisely, as is my opinion, what sceptical (philosophical) texts are meant for.

In contrast to such ways of dealing with the possibilities of thought, `dogmatic´ philosophical texts do not put a validity context into question into which they have placed themselves, and also they do not playfully discuss other, contradicting possibilities of considering a subject or a method. Doxic thought, dogmatic philosophy, as for the start we may state as a somewhat rough insight, are characterised by dealing with a problem in a rather one-dimensional way. Nonsense texts and paradox-oriented thought is capable of achieving more, because it includes several dimensions of thought, because it proceeds (or at least is capable of proceeding) in a performative, self-reflecting way, and because, by undermining certainties, it makes the readers join the process of thinking and makes them reflect on the starting points or their own thought. Dogmatic philosophy produces theories consisting of data, concepts, definitions, statements, combinations of statements and conclusions which are meant to prove that the author `is right´. Sometimes these statements as well as the production of theories are pursued with all the earnestness and personal conviction one is capable of. If necessary, one is ready to defend them in a way which itself can no longer really be called philosophical. The goal is to achieve insights which are so well-grounded that nobody will ever be able to say anything against them. One side effect in this context, which may appear with some authors, is that they believe to have a monopoly on the truth.

The opposite side has a completely different idea of what philosophy may, and is supposed to, achieve. Their goal is: toying with the truth, for the purpose of achieving insight into the conditions for truth. Its representatives warn: be careful when it comes to the monopoly on truth! This has never been good for the world, in the best case you make a fool of yourself, in the worst case you wage war to maintain your conviction of having a monopoly on the truth. This side of philosophy has always been making use of a much bigger tool set for formulating and composing philosophical texts. Its way of philosophising belongs to the tradition of philosophical rhetoric or `rhetorilogic´ as well as of scepticism. It makes use of ambiguity, that is the cross-over of speech proper and metaphorical speech, most of all in the context of satire and irony, it makes use of figures and dialogues for composing and modifying certain aspects of a debate, it arranges complex layers of irritation and of questioning allegedly safe knowledge, and indeed it simply puts frequently into question what has been claimed, sometimes even by preceding statements of one´s own text.

In this context, indeed because of the complex composition, this must be distinguished from Pyrrhonic scepticism which steps up to declare any claim to any kind of knowledge null and void. This is not the point, this would just be boring. It is about toying with certainties, about the insight into the exact circumstances and concomitants of Socrates´s `I know that I know nothing´. This dictum is itself one of the most prominent statements on this line of tradition, and in an ambiguous way it makes our self-understanding as being knowledgeable a topic of discussion.

One very impressive figure one may count among this sceptical line of philosophising is John Toland. Apart from David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Earl of Shaftesbury and Alexander Pope, and of course also apart of Voltaire, La Mettrie and Rousseau, he was an important author of the age of Enlightenment. Unfortunately, as I think, the satirical playfulness of these authors when toying with philosophical certainties is completely underestimated. The rhetorical, sceptical, satirical aspect of the philosophy of Enlightenment is not taken `seriously´ by conventionalists and dogmatists; its representatives are not considered equal as, it is said, they do not appear with the same seriousness, and as quite obviously they are not ready to make their convictions subject to independent assessment and decision-making about a philosophical argument.

Toland, who was a correspondence partner of Leibniz, among others, is said to have frequently, in the midst of a philosophical conversation, suddenly taken and defended his opponent´s point of view – a way of proceeding which, of course, caused much anger and severe uncertainty.[1] Apart from the fact that then one did not know anymore what to think about him, in a way his conversation partner found himself mirrored and probably had the impression to be not taken seriously anymore. We do not know if being mirrored or the lack of seriousness was the bigger problem.

Clearly, however, the intention of these actors, such as Toland, was not (only) to make fools of others but to include an additional level of reflection,[2] and this immediately in the midst of action and not at some later moment. The satirists of the age of Enlightenment were very aware that one could not mock and irritate too much, because this might possibly produce the effect that eventually nobody would take anything `seriously´.[3]

Now, other authors of the 17^th and 18^th centuries, to defend themselves against these satirists, pursued the strategy, among others, of starting to understand their approaches as theories on probabilities, whereas for one´s own theories one had in mind indeed not the search for probabilities but, of course, seeking the truth. And this was supposed to be successful by help of logic and mathematics, such as by help of the more geometric method. I am speaking of authors such as Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Charles Bonnet, Johann Heinrich Lambert and many others.

Over a period of about fifty years Kant presents a big number of larger treatises as well as many shorter papers. In my opinion, all of them taken together, including some which could not be published during his lifetime, form one single line of argument, and that is a line of argument which shows many detours and volte-faces. I am of the opinion that the main lines of his reasoning were fixed right from the beginning. The entirety resulting from all these texts is Kant´s system of a transcendental, critically grounded metaphysic. Thus, the functions of a text in Kant result, among others, from its functions in view of the whole. In some respects, this strange kind of `system´ is not complete; concerning other things, for example when it comes to the groundwork for the principles of his critical philosophy or to the structuring or classification of crucial concepts, reason-giving is so comprehensive and striking that he himself does not express any doubts, and no scepticism towards the method seems to be necessary. Thus, in view of sceptical philosophers, it is definitely possible to speak of `systems´, as indeed not all philosophical issues are dealt with a certain degree of basic openness.

Now, a partially sceptical methodology which understands irony and mockery as a means of assessing validity and `putting the truth to the test´ is not meant for the author discussing the plausibility of the concepts and arguments with him- or herself – here one must assume another dimension the author receives from the projected shared presence of text and readers.

To begin with, the many mocking and satirical texts of antiquity and late antiquity as well as of Humanism[4] lift the readers at eye level with the author. In the 17^th century, particularly Hobbes took up again the philosophical use of mockery and irony, counting most of all on interweaving serious and ironical, funny passages.[5] Hobbes as well as other authors made use of indirect speech, allegations, comparisons, and generally: of the gap between what is said and what is actually meant. Apart from irony, one makes use of means of sarcasm, such as mycterism (subsannatio), aestism, and diasyrmism. In the case of the latter it is proven that an argument is similar to another one which is evidently absurd. Furthermore, also Hobbes makes use of classical rhetoric figurae verborum, such as: anaphora, antithesis (contention or contrarium): two words which are illustratively contradicting are combined to form one contrastive pair to demonstrate the opposition; epanaphora (repetitio). The strikingly immediate repetition of one word; epanodos, a special case of the chiasm, in the case of which a group of words is repeated in reverse order;[6] dubitation, reotema, the rhetorical question (percontatio) and figurae sententiarum, that is: meiosis: understatement, usually used ironically or in a funny way; litotes: emphasis by way of understatement, the negation of the opposite or the double negative; synchoresis; aposiopesis (as a special kind of the ellipsis, leaving away most of all the end of a sentence which everybody can imagine in the sense of a telling break; tapinosis (diminution): the disparagement of a context by way of inappropriate simplicity of expression; apodioxis (abominatio, detestatio, rejectio): the disparagement of an argument. These stylistic means, predominantly dubitatio, erotemata and synchoresis, are also to be found in Kant´s texts. Dubitatio means the ironic use of pretended doubt or of ignorance.[7] This figure counts on the authors untruthfulness, just making the readers believe that he does not know about anything or cannot judge on it. Erotemata are rhetorical questions, in Kant they are hypothetical arguments. Synchoresis means a concession to the opponent´s argument, with the intention to be able to disparage it at a later stage, under more favourable circumstances.

Maintaining questions and doubts beyond each respective philosophical inquiry, as an element of the understanding of method, is successful – in Plato and in Kant – only if it is made clear that that same question or a closely related philosophical question may possibly be asked newly or differently, and this means: each according to point of view, to the methods at hand, to the tools and starting points one is equipped with. It may thus be that from a certain point of view a question can be concludingly answered, which way an answer has been proven to be successful, but it can never be ruled out that one day the question will reappear in a similar way, and rightly so, because new insights or technological achievements allow for perspectives which were impossible before. Things like this can at least not be ruled out, and from the history of ideas they are indeed known.

Is it really possible, in the proper sense, to present a philosophical system if one cannot be sure at all if it is really coherent and any possible doubt has been dispelled? Or could it be that the claim to present a philosophical system is to be found, in a more complex way, with those who keep their texts open towards the readers thinking for themselves? My answer is: Their claim to a system is no longer chronologically limited, as it also addresses and includes – by anticipating readers from other generations – future worlds.

In view of their readers, some sceptical authors provide for a meta-dialogue, such as Shaftesbury who in Miscellaneous Reflections (published posthumously in 1714) doubles his on role as an author, commenting on his own works as if they were those of a different author, thus declaring the readers judges. This way, of course, he establishes such a meta-dialogue.[8] Also in Kant there happens such a meta-dialogue, both indirectly, as I explain elsewhere, and indeed directly. Scattered all across the work, the readers are frequently addressed. The process of reflecting on hypothetical arguments is addressed, or many a difficulty posed by certain theories (of other authors). What follows now is a selection from the about 150 relevant passages in his printed works, a surprisingly big number is to be found in his first work: „Ich habe meine Leser dieser Mühe überhoben, [...]“.[9] – „Wir könnten noch mehr wie einen Streif in das Gebiete unserer Gegner thun, ihre Güter ausplündern, und dem Anhange des Cartesius so viel Siegeszeichen und Triumphbogen errichten; allein ich glaube, meine Leser werden kein großes Verlangen darnach bezeigen.“[10] – „Dieses Unterfangen wird die meisten von meinen Lesern stutzig machen; [...].“[11] – „[...] die Ermüdung, welche ich in einer so rauhen und ungebähnten Materie mit Recht von der Aufmerksamkeit meines gelehrten Lesers besorge, [...]“.[12] – „Nunmehro komme ich dahin, [...] meinen geneigten Leser vor alle mühsame Aufmerksamkeit, die ihm gegenwärtige schlechte Aufsätze verursacht haben, mit einer siegreichen Ueberzeugung [zu] belohnen.“[13] – „Die besondere Beschaffenheit dieses vorhabenden Versuches, giebt noch einige ausserordentliche Merkmahle an die Hand, die zu besondern Anmerkungen Anlaß geben können; allein ich kan mich durchaus in dieselbe nicht einlassen, nachdem die Aufmerksamkeit des geneigten Lesers, durch so viel verwickelte Untersuchungen ermüdet, vielleicht nichts mehr als den Schluß dieser Betrachtungen wünschet.“[14] – „Was ich aus diesen Analogien geschlossen habe, wird die Abhandlung selber der Untersuchung des vorurtheilfreyen Lesers darlegen.“[15] – „Wenn ich indessen den geneigten Leser zur Prüfung meiner Meinungen einlade, so besorge ich mit Recht, daß, da Hypothesen von dieser Art gemeiniglich nicht in viel besserem Ansehen, als philosophische Träume stehen, es eine saure Gefälligkeit für einen Leser ist, sich zu einer sorgfältigen Untersuchung von selbst erdachten Geschichten der Natur zu entschließen und dem Verfasser durch alle die Wendungen, dadurch er den Schwierigkeiten, die ihm aufstoßen, ausweicht, geduldig zu folgen [...].“[16] – „[...]; allein ich will meine Meinungen lieber in der Gestalt einer Hypothese vortragen und der Einsicht des Lesers es überlassen, ihre Würdigkeit zu prüfen, als durch den Schein einer erschlichenen Ueberführung ihre Gültigkeit verdächtig machen und, indem ich die Unwissenden einnehme, den Beyfall der Kenner verlieren“.[17] – „Die gegenwärtige Erklärung hat keine andere Würdigkeit, als diejenige, welche Muthmaßungen zukommt, und keinen Anspruch, als nur auf einen willkührlichen Beyfall; das Urtheil des Lesers mag sich auf diejenige Seite wenden, welche ihm die annehmungswürdigste zu seyn dünkt.“[18] – „Ich muß meine Leser um Verzeihung bitten, daß ich sie so weit an dem Firmament herumgeführt habe, um von den Begebenheiten richtig urtheilen zu können, die auf unserer Erde vorgegangen sind. Die Mühe, die man anwendet, die Quellen der Irrthümer zu verstopfen, verschafft uns auch ein gereinigtes Erkenntniß.“[19] – „Ich führe alles dieses nur kurz an und setze voraus, daß das eigene Nachdenken des Lesers das nöthige Licht über das Vorgetragene ausbreiten werde.“[20] – „Ich wünschte, daß sich meine Leser auf einen Augenblick in diejenige Verfassung des Gemüths versetzen könnten, welche Cartes für so unumgänglich nöthig zur Erlangung richtiger Einsichten hält [...].“[21] – „Ich bin demnach und villeicht ein Theil meiner Leser mit mir überzeugt, ich bin zugleich erfreut, mich als einen Bürger in einer Welt zu sehen, die nicht besser möglich war.“[22] – „Ich habe mich so wenig wie möglich mit Widerlegungen eingelassen, so sehr auch meine Sätze von anderer ihren abweichen. Diese Entgegenstellung ist etwas, das ich dem Nachdenken des Lesers, der beyde eingesehen hat, überlasse.“[23] – „Von dieser Bemerkung will ich nur noch einen Schritt thun, um mich einem wahrscheinlichen Begriff von der Entstehungsart dieser großen Massen und der Ursache ihrer Bewegungen zu nähern, indem ich die gründlichere Vollführung eines geringen Schattenrisses dem forschenden Leser selbst überlasse.“[24] – „Ich bemerke wohl: daß Lesern von aufgeklärter Einsicht in die bisherige Erläuterung weitläuftiger vorkommen werde, als nöthig ist.“[25] – „Ich habe diese zwei Sätze in der Absicht vorgetragen, um den Leser zum Nachdenken über diesen Gegenstand einzuladen. Ich gestehe auch, daß sie für mich selbst nicht licht genug, noch mit genugsamer Augenscheinlichkeit aus ihren Gründen einzusehen sind.“[26] – „Und da frage ich jeden Leser, ob, wenn er sich in Gedanken auf diesen Fall setzt, er nicht meiner Meinung beistimmen müsse.“[27] – „Warum sollte es mir nicht auch erlaubt seyn im akademischen Tone zu reden, der entscheidender ist und sowohl den Verfasser als den Leser des Nachdenkens überhebt, welches über lang oder kurz beide nur zu einer verdrießlichen Unentschlossenheit führen muß.“[28] – „Daher verdenke ich es dem Leser keinesweges, wenn er, anstatt die Geisterseher für Halbbürger der andern Welt anzusehen, sie kurz und gut als Candidaten des Hospitals abfertigt und sich dadurch alles weiteren Nachforschens überhebt.“[29] – „Dem Leser bleibt das Urtheil frey; was mich aber anlangt, so ist zum wenigsten der Ausschlag auf die Seite der Gründe des zweyten Hauptstücks bey mir groß gnug [...].“[30] – „Da ich mich jetzt beym Schlusse der Theorie von Geistern befinde, so unterstehe ich mir noch zu sagen: daß diese Betrachtung, wenn sie von dem Leser gehörig genutzt wird, alle philosophische Einsicht von dergleichen Wesen vollende [...].“[31] – „Ich kann es dem behutsamen Leser auf keinerley Weise übel nehmen, wenn sich im Fortgange dieser Schrift einiges Bedenken bey ihm geregt hätte über das Verfahren, das der Verfasser für gut gefunden hat darin zu beobachten.“[32] – „Allein ich bitte den Leser gar sehr dergleichen nicht von mir zu glauben.“[33] – „Ich habe also meine Zeit verloren, damit ich sie gewönne. Ich habe meinen Leser hintergangen, damit ich ihm nützte.“[34] – „Es ist kein Wunder, wenn der Leser diese Begriffe noch sehr unverständlich findet, die sich auch allererst im Fortgange aufklären sollen.“[35] – „Ein nachsinnender Leser wird daher den Begriff des Raumes, so wie ihn der Meßkünstler denkt [...], nicht für ein bloßes Gedankending ansehen, obgleich es nicht an Schwierigkeiten fehlt, die diesen Begriff umgeben, wenn man seine Realität, welche dem innern Sinne anschauend gnug ist, durch Vernunftideen fassen will.“[36] – „Ob ich nun das, wozu ich mich anheischig mache, in diesem Stücke geleistet habe, das bleibt gänzlich dem Urtheile des Lesers anheim gestellt, weil es dem Verfasser nur geziemt, Gründe vorzulegen, nicht aber über die Wirkung derselben bey seinen Richtern zu urtheilen.“[37] – „hier [...], da ich mir die Erlaubniß nehme, zu meinen, und dem Leser also auch frey stehen müsse, anders zu meinen“.[38] – „Hier erwarte ich an meinem Leser die Gedult und Unpartheylichkeit eines Richters, dort aber die Willfährigkeit und den Beistand eines Mithelfers.“[39] – „So muß denn der Leser von der unumgänglichen Nothwendigkeit einer solchen transscendentalen Deduction [...] überzeugt werden, weil er sonst blind verfährt [...].“[40] – „[...] allein der schon geübte Leser wird dieses von selbst thun, oder den Leitfaden dazu leicht entdecken“.[41] – „Allein ich muß, um Weitläuftigkeit zu vermeiden, die Beyspiele davon dem Nachdenken des Lesers überlassen.“[42] – „[...] so verschwindet diese Schwierigkeit, und es bleibt keine andere übrig, als die, wie überhaupt eine Gemeinschaft von Substanzen möglich sey, welche zu lösen ganz außer dem Felde der Psychologie, und, wie der Leser, nach dem, was in der Analytik von Grundkräften und Vermögen gesagt worden, leicht urtheilen wird, ohne allen Zweifel auch außer dem Felde aller menschlichen Erkenntniß liegt.“[43] – „Ich will sie jetzt nur anführen und es dem schon geübten Leser überlassen, den trüglichen Grundsätzen weiter nachzuforschen und sie aufzuheben.“[44] – „Ich setze also Leser voraus, die keine gerechte Sache mit Unrecht vertheidigt wissen wollen.“[45] – „Der critische Weg ist allein noch offen. Wenn der Leser diesen in meiner Gesellschaft durchzuwandern Gefälligkeit und Geduld gehabt hat, so mag er jetzt urtheilen, ob nicht, wenn es ihm beliebt, das Seinige dazu beizutragen, um diesen Fußsteig zur Heeresstraße zu machen, dasjenige, was viele Jahrhunderte nicht leisten konnten, noch vor Ablauf des gegenwärtigen erreicht werden möge: nemlich die menschliche Vernunft in dem, was ihre Wißbegierde jederzeit, bisher aber vergeblich, beschäfftigt hat, zur völligen Befriedigung zu bringen.“[46] – „Diese Arbeit ist schwer und erfordert einen entschlossenen Leser.“[47] – „Auch muß ein jeder einsehende Leser, wenn er diese Aufgabe nach ihrer Forderung sorgfältig überdenkt, anfangs durch ihre Schwierigkeit erschreckt, sie für unauflöslich, und gäbe es nicht wirklich dergleichen reine synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori, sie ganz und gar für unmöglich halten.“[48] – „Wenn der Leser sich über Beschwerde und Mühe beklagt, die ich ihm durch die Auflösung dieser Aufgabe machen werde, so darf er nur den Versuch anstellen, sie auf leichtere Art selbst aufzulösen.“[49] – „Ich wünsche daher, daß der kritische Leser sich mit dieser Antinomie hauptsächlich beschäftige, weil die Natur selbst sie aufgestellt zu haben scheint, um die Vernunft in ihren dreisten Anmaßungen stutzig zu machen und zur Selbstprüfung zu nöthigen. [...] Wenn der Leser nun durch diese seltsame Erscheinung dahin gebracht wird, zu der Prüfung der dabey zum Grunde liegenden Voraussetzung zurückzugehen, so wird er sich gezwungen fühlen, die erste Grundlage aller Erkenntniß der reinen Vernunft mit mir tiefer zu untersuchen.“[50] – „Dies ist nun die Aufstellung und Auflösung der ganzen Antinomie, [...], wenn gleich die Auflösung dieses Widerstreits den Leser, [...], hiedurch noch nicht völlig befriedigt haben sollte.“[51] – „Gleichwohl wird jeder unbefangene und vornehmlich in dieser Art von Speculation genugsam geübte Leser nicht unbemerkt lassen: daß der allgemeine Fatalism [...] den Begriff von Verbindlichkeit gänzlich aufhebe.“[52] – „Zu einer solchen Vollständigkeit konnte ich es aber hier noch nicht bringen, ohne Betrachtungen von ganz anderer Art herbeyzuziehen und den Leser zu verwirren.“[53] – „Der Leser wird leicht inne werden, daß unerachtet des etwas Ungewöhnlichen, welches diese Vorstellungsart der Mittheilung der Bewegung an sich hat, sie sich dennoch in das hellste Licht stellen lasse, wenn man die Weitläuftigkeit der Erläuterung nicht scheuet.“[54] – „[...] es könnten der Muthmaßungen für den Leser leicht zu viel, der Wahrscheinlichkeiten aber zu wenig werden, [...].“[55] – „Um deswillen ersuche ich den Leser, das, was zum Schlusse der Analytik über diesen Begriff gesagt wird, nicht mit flüchtigem Auge zu übersehen.“[56] – „Aus diesen Erinnerungen wird der Leser der Kritik der reinen speculativen Vernunft sich vollkommen überzeugen: wie höchstnöthig [...] jene mühsame Deduction der Kategorien war.“[57] – „Doch das ist nur meine beyläufige Meinung, die ich dem beliebigen Urtheile des Lesers Preis gebe.“[58] – „Der Leser wird diesen Entwurf zu einer möglichen Eintheilung der schönen Künste nicht als beabsichtigte Theorie beurtheilen.“[59] – „Überhaupt wird der Leser dieses nur als einen Versuch von der Verbindung der schönen Künste unter einem Princip, [...], beurtheilen und nicht als für entschieden gehaltene Ableitung derselben ansehen.“[60]

At the same time, the theoretical toolset demonstrates a basic openness towards perhaps changing conditions for the frame of validity of assumptions, presuppositions, convictions, concepts as well as for the changing conditions of data recording, e. g. in the context of experiments, and indirectly both in Plato and in Kant this is part of the foundations of philosophy, of its core, which is performatively communicated to the readers, by way of conceiving the various philosophical texts.

Now, however, an open and dialogic toying with the questions about the conditions for truth would not be considered the foundation of a philosophical system in the sense of a doctrine. This is expressed as early as by Shaftesbury, in his above mentioned Miscellaneous Reflections. There he writes about himself: `We see, however, that this author, no matter how much, as a critic, he would like to emphasize the chastened manner and precise simplicity of the ancients, still does not dare, for himself and in his main work, combining his philosophy to become a fast and streamlined edifice, or continuing his argument as a coherent chain or cord.´[61]

I quote from Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, from the article on `Plato´ (by Matthias Gatzemeier): `Philosophycally seen, the counterpart of the literary form of the dialogue is an open, dialogic way of philosophising; this implicates that we cannot speak of any “doctrine” in the sense of a more or less coherent system of “propositions” in Plato. Quite in the sense of his teacher Socrates, who says about himself that all he knows is that he knows nothing, Plato avoids presenting topical doctrines as safe knowledge; only general positions are presented as explicit knowledge, such as that generally ideas may be assumed and that there must be an idea of the good, that committing injustice is worse than suffering injustice, that it is better to assume the possibility of learning than its impossibility (Menon 86b-c), and that a life of reason should be preferred to a life of complete unreason (Philebos 18e-22c). Methodical insights, on the other hand, are more frequently identified as safe knowledge or as being indispensable in the sense of Plato´s philosophy, such as the method of dialogue, that of definition, of predication, and of the complete sentence.´[62]

Dialectics following the model of Plato-Socrates seeks the truth within the frame of clearly delimited conditions for the search. These are made transparent by way of the terms used, if necessary by the dialogue partners, by the choice of the starting point for the conversation, and by revealing the logical and theoretical toolset. In an essay on Plato´s last principles,[63] Andreas Eckl expresses his doubts that the so called doctrine of forms is an elementary part of Plato´s philosophy. Firstly, he states, in Plato there is no kind of communication which might be called a doctrine in the actual sense. Secondly, one must have a very close look at the way in which Plato elaborates and gives reasons in each individual dialogue. `What is a Platonic form can only be understood by pursuing and summarizing its each respective development in each respective dialogue. Among this there count introducing the problem, criticism of existing opinions for a solution, stating a hypothesis by which one assumes the possibility of a true opinion about the problem and, against this background, the topical formulation of a proposal, then developing this hypothesis as far as to a critical-self-critical assessment of its consequences, to then, perhaps, finally make a countercheck by way of considering the opposite of the hypothesis. Thus seen, the entire Politeia is an answer to the question of what is Plato´s idea of justice, including the attempts to define injustice, including the openness passages where he advises or demands further considerations.´[64]

In this context, he says, it is methodically fundamental that these ideas must never be achieved; in terms of philosophy it is always only about an asymptotic approach e. g. to the idea of the good or of justice in the dialogue. The insights, he states, which concerning their validity are always preliminary, may be revised, even such a revision would also happen in view of a guiding yet unachievable idea, and although it was irrelevant when this might be done, either by Plato himself in the course of writing his texts or in the third century AD or today or after four thousand years. `The dialogic way of presentation demonstrates that there is no dogmatic claim to truth. Plato the author moves within the dialectic-logical medium just like the characters of his dialogues […]. He is ahead of them only insofar as he oversees and plans the development and presentation of the problem and the approaches to solving them, whereas the characters of the dialogues work, in a presentist way, on realisation.´[65]

At the same time, in the course of using concepts during the dialogue, in the course of assessing them and in the course of gaining insights concerning their suitability or unsuitability, there crystallise concepts which are predicated as being “most important”, e. g. rest, movement, identity and difference as well as, of course, the concept of being. So Plato´s philosophical entirety would have to be understood as an open system of the constantly restarted validity assessment of certain concepts or statements. The means of the philosophical discourse are: hypothetical arguments, including reductiones ad absurdum, interwoven conceptual paradoxes, concepts or expressions which are insufficiently defined or even applied without sufficient definition and which, in the course of the elaborations, are improved and polished, classified and more clearly distinguished from each other.

In my opinion, Kant´s critical method is methodically very similar. For Kant, philosophy is a discursive science,[66] thus definitions or at least preliminary definitions are only possible after certain considerations and lines of reasoning. Throughout many of his texts, Kant´s opinion concerning certain philosophical issues seems to change – at least this is an impression one may have. If the observation is reduced to the fact that in different texts we find different statements on certain complexes of issues, one might as well just state: the ways in which problems and questions are dealt with are not the same throughout the entire work, contrary to the expectation one might have after once a method and starting point have been dogmatically fixed, to then be neither changed nor constantly be discussed or put into question.

To get along with these contrasts and divergences throughout his entire work, which at first sight may be read as a methodical tentativeness, since the mid-19^th century Kant has been interpreted according to the idea that the author experienced a constant development of his thought.

Thus, what has not at all been taken into consideration is the possibility that all those peculiarities were purposefully composed into the texts, indeed as an element of a complex, rhetorically refined train of thought in the argumentative sense. Now, however, if one actually reads the entirety of his printed works as such a way of arguing, one is soon convinced of the plausibility of this approach. For example, one achieves the insight that over long passages terms are used in a pre-terminological way and that their concluding definition and improvement happens only after they have been assessed for their suitability, and usually this happens only in later texts. If Kant is read in the way I suggest, one starts understanding him to be an author who presents a complex composition of a gigantic network of philosophical issues in the form of a structure of questions, in the context of which the questions are completed by answers coming from tradition, a tradition from which Kant moves away in the course of his elaborations or which he positively integrates into his own considerations. Over several texts, a complex of issues is philosophically analysed. At first the necessary concepts and assumptions are introduced and discussed in the context of different problematisations. Different strategies are crossed-over; each according to the concept or theory under analysis, a question or a riddle is solved sometimes sooner, sometimes later.

The reader is presented with the structure of questions in a very unique way, and not necessarily he/she will note that a formulation or the certain way of using a term is meant as a provocation and the reader is supposed to react by starting to contemplate the reading matter for him/herself. Thus, I claim that Kant enters into an indirect dialogue with his readers, which is supposed to teach them, by way of his printed works, how to learn to think for themselves. Thus, after all they are given an understanding not only of the problems connected to the subject but also of the methodical problems.

As a conclusion, I would like to give concrete insight into certain methodical elements, dedicated to problematisation,[67] at first into the debate on the scopes of mathematics and philosophy, which permeates all of Kant´s works, and then into a detail from his first work.

1. How mathematics and philosophy are related to each other

The mathematisation of the sciences was what Descartes, Weigel or Wolff were out for. Universal mathematicians refer to the programme of philosophical reason-giving by way of eliminating doubts, as in particular Descartes, Galilei and Hobbes strived for. Oriented at such a resistance to doubt are also theories gaining a radical kind of idealism or scepticism from methodical doubt. The Cartesian idea of achieving an improvement of the method of the metaphysics by help of mathesis universalis is adopted by Kant half way of his works, and in my opinion it counters polemic and mocking attacks by Gassendi. Gassendi, Crusius, Rüdiger, in his own way also Berkeley, as well as many Thomasians who considered universal mathematics an absurdity. Crusius and Reimarus understand mathematics to be a synthetic-demonstrative, not an analytical discipline.[68] Thus, Kant´s oft-quoted statement that true science is possible only where also mathematics are to be found[69] is also a reference to Gassendi´s `Per Mathematicas scimus, si quid scimus´ from the Exercitationes.[70] Kant adopts this statement for his assessment of the suitability of mathematics as a secure foundation for metaphysics as a science, and he adopts it from Gassendi´s clear irony, so that in Kant this statement cannot at all be understood literally. It is part of a hypothetical argumentation. In Kant, after all the specification of the methodical foundation of a scientific kind of metaphysics happens not by way of mathematisation or quantification but by way of a keen and critically justified theory of thinking, transcendentally explicable subjectivity. In Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Present itself as a Science (Prolegomena) as well as in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science hypothetically, along the question if nevertheless it is objective reality which provides insight with outward meaning, Kant accentuates mathematics as the guarantor of scientificity and a priori insight - but only in scientific fields where that makes sense. „Also wird, um die Möglichkeit der Naturdinge, mithin um diese a priori zu erkennen, noch erfordert, daß die dem Begriffe correspondirende Anschauung a priori gegeben werde, d. i. daß der Begriff construirt werde. Nun ist die Vernunfterkenntniß durch Construction mathematisch. Also mag zwar eine reine Philosophie der Natur überhaupt […] auch ohne Mathematik möglich seyn, aber eine reine Naturlehre über bestimmte Naturdinge […] ist nur vermittelst der Mathematik möglich, […] da in jeder Naturlehre nur so viel eigentliche Wissenschaft angetroffen wird, als sich darin Erkenntniß a priori befindet“.[71] To conclude the essay, by way of specified conceptual conjunctions, it is made clear that the `mathematical-mechanical way of explaining´ has other competences than `the metaphysical-dynamic´ one; when speaking of physical bodies and empty spaces, one may operate with mathematical evidence; but when speaking of basic forces of matter, one is beyond all possibilities of mathematics.[72] To conclude the work, the methodical differences are underlined. Mathematics, it says, do not count among transcendental philosophy[73] but belong to a metaphysically-grounded natural science.[74] 

Of course, all Kant´s contemporaries distinguish between mathematics as a quantifying discipline and philosophy, which refers to qualities.[75] Also Kant taught mathematics as an art of measurement[76] and also Kant separates extensive from intensive quantities. The former, he says, are countable quantities, the latter refer to a unity and a reason. A perception is an intensive quantity, i. e. to `all objects of sentience, as far as the latter contains perception, there must be attributed intensive quantity, i. e. a degree of influencing meaning´.[77] However, when concluding his work he rejects any in principle classification according to quantity and quality,[78] after having made hypothetical use of them in his work. Kant defines philosophy as the `science of the genius´,[79] not of the mathematician. It is the goal of philosophy, he states, to achieve comprehensive clarity, in the sense of a logical and at the same time aesthetic completeness of insight,[80] which is particularly treated in Logics - A Handbook. When it comes to Kant´s overall intentions, at first the pure part of metaphysics: transcendental philosophy, is to be presented, and only then a part which refers to the concrete aspects of conceptions and sentiences.[81] For, only presentation provides concepts with objective reality;[82] its logical function in the form of visual imagination is to `make [deduced concepts] suitable for experiential use´.[83]

2. Details of the first essay, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces and Assessment of the Demonstrations that Leibniz and other Scholars of Mechanics have made use of in this Controversial Subject, together with some Prefatory Considerations Pertaining to the Force of Bodies in General, printed in 1749

In Kant´s work, even as early as in his first essay, both his closeness to and his struggle with Leibniz is crucial.[84] Sometimes this includes polemics. According to Leibniz, living force is a quality only of real movements. Kant reprimands the concept of true or real movement as used by Leibniz, Wolff or Newton.[85] Leibniz connects the beginning of a movement to the concept of reality.[86] Metaphysically seen, striving for movement, conatus or nisus, already includes the fullness of being of the thus created real movement. Thus, what is real is the aspect of striving for, in the course of which there happens the change from dead force, which cannot be sensually perceived, `from endlessly many continued impressions´, to living force which is `connected to real movement´.[87] Now with the push, says Leibniz, `the force is alive, created by endlessly many continued impressions of dead force´.[88] Leibniz speaks of vis viva in the case of moved,[89] of vis mortua in the case of static bodies leaning towards movement.[90] Both, he says, are related to each other like line and point or like plane and line.[91] Also e. g. Johann Bernoulli discusses how, successively, a living force is created out of a dead force.[92] Kant, however, critically remarks that it is impossible to establish a quantifiable, finite quantity by way of adding an endless number of small quantities within a finite timespan.[93] And thus, he says, no living force can come from dead forces within a finite timespan. Kant confronts the idea of the Leibniz disciples, that real forces are equivalent to real movements, and dead forces are equivalent to static bodies, by asking how, then, a dead force could, within a finite timespan, become a living force. For this purpose, in the course of a longer, polemic passage,[94] he makes use of the term vivification, which he takes from Protestant theology[95] and by which he caricatures the change from a dead to a living force. The passages on “vivification” have been considered a failed attempt by Kant.[96]

Kant´s first essay includes many more polemic-ironic passages; usually one will easily recognize them by their wording, by words such as “wonderful”, “paradox” or “easy”. In the following, some passages are quoted.

§. 6 „Eine gleiche Schwierigkeit äussert sich, wenn die Frage ist, ob die Seele auch im Stande sey die Materie in Bewegung zu setzen. [...] Eben so leicht ist es auch die Art vom paradoxen Satze zu begreifen, wie es nemlich möglich sey: daß die Materie von der man doch in der Einbildung stehet, daß sie nichts als nur Bewegungen verursachen könne, der Seele gewisse Vorstellungen und Bilder eindrücke. [...].“

§.7 „[...] so ist es wohl möglich, daß ein Ding würklich existire, aber doch nirgends in der ganzen Welt verhanden sey. Dieser paradoxe Satz, ob er gleich eine Folge und zwar eine sehr leichte Folge der bekanntesten Wahrheiten ist, ist so viel ich weiß, noch von niemanden angemerket worden. Allein es fließen noch andere Sätze aus derselben Quelle, die nicht minder wunderbar sind, und den Verstand so zu sagen wider seinen Willen einnehmen.“

§.9 „Es ist leicht zu erweisen, daß kein Raum und keine Ausdehnung seyn würden, wenn die Substanzen keine Kraft hätten ausser sich zu würken. Denn ohne diese Kraft ist keine Verbindung, ohne diese keine Ordnung, und ohne diese endlich kein Raum. Allein es ist etwas schwerer einzusehen, wie aus dem Gesetze, nach welchem diese Kraft der Substanzen ausser sich würket, die Vielheit der Abmessungen des Raumes herfolge. [...].“

§.122 [hypothetical premise: A body at rest ..]

A body at rest is provided with dead power, a moving body is provided with live power, and between both states there happens a gradual transition with an endless number of intermediate stages.

„[...] Ferner fließet hieraus kraft des Gesetzes der Continuität, daß eben derselbe Körper, der im Anfangsaugenblicke eine todte Kraft hat, und hernach eine lebendige überkommt, die gegen die erstere wie eine Fläche gegen die erzeugende Linie ist, diese Kraft erst in einer endlichen Zeit erlange. Denn, wenn man setzen wollte, er überkomme diese letztere Kraft nicht in einer endlichen Zeit von dem Anfangs-Augenblicke, sondern unmittelbar in dem unendlich kleinen Zeittheilchen nach demselben: so würde dieses so viel sagen, daß er in dem Anfangsaugenblicke selber die lebendige Kraft schon habe. Denn das Gesetz der Continuität, und selbst die Mathematik, beweiset, daß es einerley sey, ob ich sage der Körper befinde sich im Anfangs-Augenblicke seiner Bewegung, oder in dem unendlich kleinen Zeittheilchen nach demselben. Nun ist aber die Kraft in dem Anfangs-Puncte der Bewegung selber todt: also kann man, ohne einen Widerspruch zu begehen, nicht sagen, daß sie hernach lebendig sey, als wenn man zugleich festsetzet, daß diese lebendige Kraft in ihr allererst nach einer endlichen Zeit, nach der Wirkung der äusserlichen Ursache, in ihr angetroffen werde. /Die Naturkraft des Körpers setzet nemlich den von draussen empfangenen Eindruck in sich selber fort, und indem sie, durch eine fortgesetzte Bestrebung, die Intension, die vorher wie ein Punct war, in sich häufet, bis sie wie eine Linie wird, die der von draussen in sie erregten Kraft, die sich wie die Geschwindigkeit verhielte, proportional ist, so häufet sie hiedurch die von draussen erlangte Kraft selber, welche vorher auch nur wie eine Linie war, daß sie jetzo wie eine Fläche ist, in der die eine Seite die äusserlich ertheilte Geschwindigkeit und Kraft vorstellet, die andere aber, die aus dem inneren des Körpers von selber erwachsene Intension vorbildet, die jener proportional ist.“

§.123 „Denjenigen Zustand, da die Kraft des Körpers zwar noch nicht lebendig ist, aber doch dazu fortschreitet, nenne ich die Lebendigwerdung, oder Vivification derselben. In der Zwischenzeit also, darinn die Kraft sich zur lebendigen erhebet, welche zwischen den beyden Puncten, dem Anfangs-Puncte, und demjenigen, da die Kraft schon völlig lebendig ist, begriffen wird, hat der Körper noch nicht seine Kraft und Geschwindigkeit in sich selber hinlänglich gegründet. Hie wird es vielleicht meinem Leser einfallen zu fragen, wie denn der Körper in dieser Zwischenzeit im Stande sey, seine ihm ertheilte Geschwindigkeit frey und einförmig zu erhalten und fortzusetzen, da er doch alsdenn seine Kraft und Bewegung in sich selber noch nicht hinlänglich gegründet hat, und folglich sie auch nicht selber erhalten kan. Hierauf antworte ich: die Kraft ist in dieser Zwischenzeit zwar freylich nicht so beschaffen, daß sich aus ihr eine immerwährend freye und unverminderte Bewegung verstehen liesse, wenn sie nicht durch die innere Bestrebung noch weiter erhoben würde. Allein ob die Bestrebung der Kraft sich zu erhalten in dieser Art unvollständig ist, davon ist hie nicht die Rede. Es frägt sich nur: ob die Intension der Kraft, die noch nicht so weit erwachsen ist, daß sie die Bewegung unvermindert und unaufhörlich erhalten könne, doch wenigstens sie diejenige Zeit hindurch erhalten könne, die bis zur vollendeten Vivification nöthig ist. Daß dieses aber nicht allein möglich sey, sondern sich auch in der That so verhalte, erhellet hieraus, weil in dieser ganzen Zwischenzeit, jeden Augenblick ein neues Element der Intension in dem Körper entspringet, welches die gegebene Geschwindigkeit ein unendlich kleines Zeittheilchen erhält, folglich alle die Elemente dieser Intension, die die ganze Zwischenzeit in dem Körper entspringen, in allen Augenblicken derselben, das ist in der ganzen Zeit, dieselbe Geschwindigkeit erhalten, [...].“

§. 131. „[...] Ich bin in dem Besitze, einige Gesetze darzulegen, nach denen die Vivification oder Lebendigwerdung der Kraft geschiehet, allein, da diese Abhandlung den ersten Plan dieser so neuen und unvermutheten Eigenschaften der Kräfte zu entwerfen bemühet ist, so muß ich mit Recht besorgen, daß meine Leser, die vornemlich begierig sind von dem Hauptwesen gewiß gemacht zu werden, sich mit Verdruß in einer tiefen Untersuchung einer Nebensache verwickelt sehen möchten, zumal, da es Zeit genug ist, sich darinn einzulassen, wenn das Hauptwerk erstlich genugsam gesichert, und durch Erfahrungen bewähret ist. [...].“

Conclusion

If the above sketched games of questions and answers is supposed to make philosophy in such a way as enabling humans, across the ages and across academic, discipline-related and other factions, to cooperatively practice thinking and considering, this might be something to spread out. And it might also be that this way we are going to succeed with realising Enlightenment in the world. Just imagine that philosophical texts would no longer be exclusively negotiated among relevant expert circles, just imagine they would reach the streets – certainly this would be a great gain for philosophy and beyond.

Translation: Mirko Wittwar