Kant and Eclecticism

In the history of occidental thought, for a long time two ways of relating oneself to previous authors were common. One is characterised by a certain belief in authority and connected to the term <philosophical school>. Thinkers adopt the ideas, methods and approaches, the questions as well as the terminological tool set of their teachers. The other way of relating oneself to those from which one has learned – for nobody is born with a ready-made philosophical programme – is a way of critically dealing with predecessors which, for a long time, has been called <eclectic>.

However, these days, both in terms of the history of philosophy and quite generally, we consider this to be somewhat problematic, for: eclecticism is one of those terms which have experienced a highly remarkable change of meaning. In the case of this term this comes along with a regrettable expulsion to a place where, philosophically seen, nobody wants to be. For, today’s meaning is something like: from existing material somebody chooses what is suitable for their purposes and puts it together in a wild and unstructured way. We may call music, architecture, clothing, or indeed philosophical texts <eclectic>, and if we do so, this is clearly meant as a more or less vicious depreciation. For, it is meant to say that this matter has no value, that it is nothing <of one’s own>, that somebody has just <served themselves> from something which was there anyway. Thus, the alleged achievement would just to be owed to other people, and at best it would be something like successful copying or plagiarising.

For: today the people think that creativity and any kind of action which might be helpful for humankind must necessarily consist of creating something <new>.

On the other hand, however, everybody knows that always, whatever we were doing, we have been standing on somebody´s shoulders, to have it in Newton’s words, and that perhaps we may discover new ways and invent new things, but always only based on what others have been achieving before. With all due respect to all theories on emergence, this is true: presuppositionless thought and experimenting are impossible – at least in my opinion. Whenever somebody has succeeded with treading new paths and this has become general awareness, usually it is made into a success story, and these success stories are told by leaving away those who paved the way, the pioneers, those on whose shoulders the inventors have been sitting. Of course this very much improves the dramaturgy, however at the same time it falsifies the history of the invention, and furthermore this way those are treated unjustly who, although they may have not made the breakthrough themselves, still laid the groundwork in the widest sense. Thus: <breakthroughs> and similar narratives (<they were on the eve of revolution>) are always narrations in retrospect, and for those simply being in the midst of events, not being aware of any breakthrough, they are no adequate narrations.

Now, historically seen, eclecticism had over long periods of time, and in delimitation from the above mentioned belief in authority, an extraordinarily sceptical, critical and thus positive meaning – in contrast to today: an eclecticist in this sense was somebody who, for example for Christian Thomasius or Denis Diderot, did not accept any dictate by anyone concerning what to think, and who trusted exclusively in their own reason, their own judgment when it came to deciding if something, an idea or a theory, was to be considered true or false. The reader will note: also this is about dealing with something existing and not first of all about inventing anything new and unprecedented. It is only that indeed over long periods of the history of thought this way of discussing matters, that is: a prudent, assessing discussion which thoroughly considers the pros and cons and, based on this assessment, deciding independently, was named by the positive term eclecticism.

Of course, in the context of scientific work, actually this is the way of proceeding still today, in a way it is a crucial element of the scientific ethos: one must critically discuss what one is presented with by others, one must state or at least develop one´s own point of view in this respect, and one must give the reasons. This may lead to adopting theories or elements, just the same it may lead to rejecting them or, for example, one is of the opinion that here and there they are not sufficiently grounded, e. g. by pointing out to how ways of arguing or definitions might be improved.

Of course, this way also always the world is provided with something <new>. Of course improving something which already exists creates something <new>, in a way – but this does not happen in a vacuum but is immediately connected to what is already existent. By their nature of improving the already existing, radically <new> discoveries and inventions, such as in the natural sciences, have always also a revolutionary aspect, this is for sure. But it is as certain that these revolutions look so <new> to us because in all such cases, as sketched above, a success story makes a better story. Of course, sensations sell much better than plainly explaining the details of continuous work on a problem which then was indeed radically changed by somebody who perhaps took a different view.

Now I ask myself: is such a view appropriate at all for philosophy? Certainly, philosophers always also refer to their own times and to the circumstances under which they live, they react to current problems which might result from the social existence of humans, but when it comes to their conceptual material and their methods there are no such revolutions as some people would like to see.

In the fine arts, in music, in literature or in film, here and there it may be that something unprecedented is created, however much more frequently one relates oneself to what has already been presented by others, which may be called quoting, referring, or even revering. And after all it is precisely this relating which frequently fascinates us, whose details make us happy, although it is not at all certain that we will always succeed with discovering allegations and quotations. By this way of establishing references a large network is created, covering the cultural and creative activity of humankind at all times and in all spaces.

Thus, what we have is an older concept of eclecticism which has fallen into oblivion these days, and a modern one, in the context of which the negative connotations coming along with the meaning of the modern, today frequently applied concept of eclecticism clearly suggest that it is not at all worthwhile to discuss its older meaning or to take notice of it at all.

Kant was no eclecticist.  – To decide if this statement is true, at first we must clarify which meaning is supposed to be attributed to the word eclecticist. It is a true statement if we understand the attribution in the common, pejorative sense of today. It is a wrong statement – thus: Kant was indeed an eclecticist – if we understand the attribution according to the older meaning of eclecticism, which has fallen into oblivion today. However, if we proceed this way, thus if we choose the older meaning, at first we must make a detour, by having a careful look at how exactly Kant proceeds. For, Kant improves eclecticism by way of his critique, however without abandoning or negating it.

Eclecticism has experienced such a fundamental, distressing shift of meaning that today the term cannot be used anybody, nowhere and in no case, in its original, positive meaning. Eclecticism has become a label for devastating depreciation, a pejorative term par excellence. And now, there were indications of this development as early as in Kant´s time which, in my opinion, is an important reason why Kant himself avoids any proximity of his own way of proceeding to this possible label.

Now, however, this raises the question: why then should we operate with the older concept, what might be the methodical advantages (precisely in view of Kant)? My answer to this is structured into a general part and a part which particularly refers to Kant.

1. In general terms, it would be prudent to at first have a closer look at the shift of meaning of such a label for such a way of proceeding, as it is inherent with the term eclecticism, and to scrutinise it. Does anybody really believe, even when it comes to contexts of today, that all those having been or being called eclecticists in the pejorative sense really proceed exactly in this way, thus: in a <negative-eclectic> way, with their theoretical or artistic work? Now then, we may plausibly suspect that such attributions in the polemic or condemning sense have come or still come from people who did or do  not like this alleged eclecticist.

   Now it is interesting that indeed there was an antagonist for the older, positive concept of eclecticism, that is there was a word for arbitrarily, indiscriminately picking up or copying already existing material, which was e. g. called <syncretism> or indeed <elective> proceeding, and thus that what up to here has been described as a shift of meaning is basically rather an impoverishment of meaning or indeed: a simplification of certain aspects of proceeding which are now sweepingly labelled as eclecticism. The fact that this way all positive aspects which once were connected to the term have been eliminated, indeed purposefully eliminated, is in my opinion, philosophy-historically seen, due to the strange idea that the thought of mankind <progresses> in a way which allows for declaring obsolete everything which has been before.

2. Kant’s method throughout his work is an immediate continuation of the focal ideas of the culture of eclecticism, at the same time, by his method of critique, Kant goes beyond eclecticism as such. Eclecticism, which forms the cultural-theoretical background of all Early Enlightenment, shows two crucial programmatic traits: the emphasis on independent thought, that is the strict rejection of authorities, as well as the demand for the inevitable discussion of what exists. One of its programmatic demands is: <test them everything; hold fast what is good>.[1]

   In Kant, this develops into <test all approaches, comment them, contrast them with each other and possibly integrate some of them into one’s own system>. Kant methodologically completes and extends this eclecticism by several aspects, among others he combines it with a procedure of comprehensive commenting which in the following will be called <glossing>. Kant’s way of proceeding is an analogy to the commenting practice of many medieval manuscripts, by way of which unfamiliar terms or difficult matters are explained, presented in more detail, translated and this way made <familiar> and are thus integrated into the editor’s hermeneutic background. However, in Kant the glossed reference texts are only present in the form of allegations and short references.

In the sense of a selection, eclecticism refers to adopting ideas and theories from existing works, for the purpose of appropriation or commenting. In Early Enlightenment, the freedom of proceeding is emphasized in this context. The free choice is supposed to happen by the stock of theories being comprehensively taken into consideration and sceptically assessed. Thus, in the 17^th and 18^th centuries an eclectic way of thinking was understood to be Enlightened thinking, as Diderot had it in his article on Eclecticisme in the Encyclopédie.[2] Eclecticists, he says, are Enlightened thinkers, their criterion is scepticism. An eclectic philosopher, Diderot explains, treats traditional reason-giving with contempt and prioritises independent thought. He only accepts the evidence of his own experience and reason. His ambitions are less to dictate to humankind or to educate them but rather to be their student, less to reform them than to reform himself, less to know the truth but to seek it.[3]

To judge adequately on eclecticism in the older sense, most of all the aspect of impartiality would have to be emphasized, which must be linked to a comprehensive knowledge of relevant theories. For, selecting is impartial only if it happens independently of existing doctrines. To happen freely, a comprehensive knowledge of what is given is indispensable. For the 18^th century we may still assume that this was possible. Then however, for the 19^th century, given the constantly growing masses of texts, it may well be that the programmatic idea of eclecticism became an idea which could no longer be realised. Also this may have contributed to eclecticism, since the 19^th century, no longer being understood as a purposeful selection but as an arbitrary collecting of thoughts.

The pejorative judgement on eclecticism also goes back to Hegel, for Hegel in his elaborations on the history of philosophy classifies other theories and systems according to them being “true philosophy” or not.[4] If theories are philosophically combined with each other, he says, so that “the innermost of the different philosophies [can be recognized] as being one and the same”, this must be distinguished from “eclecticism which is roaming on its surface”.[5] Eclecticists, he states, adopt only, “this thing from one philosophy and that thing from another one, without consequences”, which just results in “a superficial aggregate”. “Such eclecticists are sometimes the most uneducated people, in whose minds there is room for the most contradicting ideas, without ever bringing their ideas together and being aware of their contradictions; or those prudent people doing so on purpose and believing to achieve the best results by taking the good things, as they call it, from each system”, which way after all they “just have the consequence but not thought itself”.[6] Now, however, Hegel uses the term eclecticism in the negative sense. Although he distinguishes a philosophical method which, in the positive sense, is connected to Alexandrian philosophy,[7] unfortunately he has no name for this positively emphasized method. Actually Thomasius, who in this lecture is almost ignored by Hegel,[8] had indeed called this method, praised so much by Hegel, eclecticism. Hegel speaks out in favour of the method of “uniting the older systems”, in the sense of a deeper “understanding of the philosophical idea”.[9] In my opinion, Kant´s work must be understood to be such a self-reflecting meta-conception; differences between traditional concepts and ways of thought are, moreover, placed under new horizons of judgement.

Thinking for oneself, says Kant, is based on assessment criteria: „Maximen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes […] sind folgende: 1. Selbstdenken; 2. An der Stelle jedes andern denken; 3. Jederzeit mit sich selbst einstimmig denken. […] Die erste ist die Maxime einer niemals passiven Vernunft“.[10] Extended thought becomes obvious if somebody „sich über die subjectiven Privatbedingungen des Urtheils […] wegsetzen kann und aus einem allgemeinen Standpuncte (den er dadurch nur bestimmen kann, daß er sich in den Standpunct anderer versetzt) über sein eigenes Urtheil reflectirt“.[11] „Selbstdenken heißt den obersten Probirstein der Wahrheit in sich selbst (d. i. in seiner eigenen Vernunft) suchen; und die Maxime, jederzeit selbst zu denken, ist die Aufklärung“.[12]

Extended thought, he says, is the same as the critical method, for only if the knowledge of the criteria to be applied can be assumed (prescribed), not only this knowledge of methods is significant but also the question of its justification, which way Kant connects to the older, logical concept of critique (ars critica) in the sense of a dialectic. The realisation of extended thought requires the capability of taking the points of view of other people into consideration, and this again requires knowledge of them. Theoretical contradictions leading to factional strife or antinomy, he says, cannot be solved by any kind of factional zealousness.[13] Rather, what is necessary is assessing the opaque use of that same concept which leads to contradictions, to contrary or counter-intuitive statements. Kant makes such assessments in many of his works.[14]     

In Kant´s Critique, Eclecticism is neither adopted nor rejected, but according to an intrinsic improvement demand of eclecticism Kant achieved a better procedural basis. In terms of methodology, Kant emphasizes assessment as well as the thus necessary criteria – a judgement which finds expression also by the idea of the judge (krités) and the legal court, which is crucial in his work.[15]

Eclecticism and Critique have already been connected by research,[16] although in view of sceptical thought, which connects both, and of the reference to practical issues which is intrinsic to both methodical concepts. Yet still, it does not seem to make sense to consider Kant´s Critique against the background of eclecticism. Indeed, when it comes to the emphasis on thinking for oneself, eclecticism and Critique do coincide,[17] and concerning thinking for oneself and unconstrained thought Kant definitely refers to the Horace quotation which is paradigmatic for eclecticism: Nullius addictus iurare ad verba Magistri.[18] However, the textual evidence in Kant does not show any immediate reference to eclecticism. In his printed work Kant mentions <the eclecticists> only two times.[19]

That in this context Kant does not take eclecticism into consideration is due to the fact that indeed it does not show any rules which could be universalised and that thus, according to Kant´s criteria, it is no scientific category. „Wenn man etwas Methode nennen soll, so muß es ein Verfahren nach Grundsätzen seyn“.[20] As a matter of fact, Diderot´s or Thomasius´s eclecticism is somewhat vague. There are no procedural rules for selection. The decision about what is supposed to be selected is left to the individual. Thus, even if eclecticism, based on the rejection of authorities and due to the emphasis on thinking for oneself, was the praised method of Early Enlightenment, doubtlessly, due to the freedom of choice of any theoretician, it resulted in a multitude of approaches without principles of the method having been worked out. On the other hand, by far this does not justify the claim that “a lack of method belongs to the essence of eclecticism”, a claim which also Albrecht calls “sheer assumption”.[21] From the point of view of the philosophers of Early Enlightenment, a general theory of method would probably have nourished the suspicion that it claimed authority over thought.

To assess claims to validity, critical philosophy must know the biggest possible number of existing theories, precisely because the origin of a position is not vital, and neutrality is imperative even when it comes to one´s own opinion. According to Kant, any theory contains a degree of truth.[22] However, connecting to one must ask about the criteria for justifying such certainties. Whereas eclecticists quite generally demand a middle course between unmistakable certainties and deceptive uncertainties,[23] Kant demands certainties of method. As it is capable of generally stating its criteria, Critique is also a counterdraft to eclecticism a la Diderot, according to which the eclecticist, although impartially seeking the truth, does not consider teaching his insights to others.[24] Kant, on the other hand, explicitly includes, as a way of proceeding, the idea of education into his Critique, like he also names Early Modern theories as remedies for and improvements of reason.[25]

Eclecticism includes the idea that philosophy also always claims to be a philosophy of philosophy.[26] As such, it strives for an impartial quest for truth and claims to be a universal science reflecting on methods[27] - also Kant bases his system on both. He distinguishes the <critical> business of basing principles from the <doctrinaire> business[28] which, subsequent to the latter, has the task of building metaphysics as a system. Not at all, however, these two businesses are mutually excluding. Kant makes the in principle interminability of philosophy a topic of discussion when it comes to the definition of terms,[29] in the context of which he states: pretending the ownership of wisdom, as it is propagated by enthusiastic authors, spells “doom to all philosophy”.[30] The basic traits of eclecticism are thinking for oneself, reasonable doubts, assessment and keeping what has been selected according to criteria which are independent of authorities. This <Thomasius eclecticism> is also to be found in Christian Wolff and, just the same, in Kant. Kant proceeds eclectically, by referring to tradition which, in the form of comprehensive <glossing>, is constitutive for his own theory.

In the above sketched sense, Kant goes beyond eclecticism and critique by, for the structure of his overall work, striving for glossing and commenting, thus demonstrating, like with a panorama, his contextualization and integration of relevant theories from the past and present. One may speak of panorama-glossing, or of compendium commenting. What makes Kant so extraordinarily special and conceptionally unique is that he strives for completeness when it comes to this taking theories into consideration in the context of the structure of his work. Rhetorically and stylistically, by way of alluding to referentiality, the commented on material is contrasted to presenting his own theories, however what is crucial is this: frequently, through all his works, this presentation cannot be fully understood without the theories it refers to.

Now, Kant´s method might be called a <commenting method>, however calling it <glossing> seems to be more appropriate. For his <glosses>, understood as clarifying, translating approaches inscribed into the stock of traditional texts, by way of which Kant translates, combines, reshapes problematic or insufficiently grounded concepts and classifications from elsewhere into the mode of thought of his own philosophical horizon, making them entirely at home within his own system while sometimes integrating them, show how close to and how much embedded he is in the lines of reasoning of the theories he refers to. This could also be achieved by way of commenting, however then it would basically rather have to be understood in the sense of distancing comments. If we have a closer look at the typical features of Kant´s overall work, which here can only be sketched, it becomes obvious - as is my conclusion - that today´s distinction between a <historical> and a <systematic> interest in philosophy cannot be applied to Kant´s work and his way of discussing other authors, their theories are exclusively measured by their claims to validity and not judged by the date of their creation.