Warning notice: On philosophical irony in Kant
That special kind of philosophical irony which, in my opinion, occurs in Kant in the sense of the entire work being methodically composed as one, and this means most of all performatively, is frequently connected to a <hypothetical-deductive method> the train of thought as a whole and the individual parts of the work are based on.
In this context, hypotheses and irony have always the task of somehow starting or stimulating the scientific, philosophical dealing with a topic, a subject. Many sentences, expressions, passages are not at all meant as lessons, they are not meant for writing down or keeping in mind any truths. No: they are meant as triggers, as stimuli, as a first chord, a motif, based on which then consideration may start.
Some people´s first reaction to such an interpretative approach will be: what now, is Kant´s philosophy going to be deprived of its <seriousness>, is now everything going to be declared a joke? This must not be, this cannot be, and thus such an approach is reprehensible, and we are not going to deal with in earnest.
My answer is: many people today have forgotten how extremely valuable hypotheses are for philosophical work. I mean, it is worthwhile to critically assess one´s own dogmatism, as I like to call it for once, and I am convinced that accepting the value of non-dogmatic ways of getting access to knowledge, insight and self-awareness will not at all lead us away from transcendental philosophy and Kant´s critical method but that, on the contrary, we are going to move closer to it and will thus become more familiar with it.
I understand the entire corpus of Kant´s works as a kind of staged argumentation, planned out in advance, and realising a train of thought which shows many purposefully composed volt-faces and retarding elements, taking the readers with it to some philosophical searching and finding as it could not be presented in a more interesting way. Again and again, inquisitive considerations, anti-theses, deductions, definitions in the field of logics and metaphysics, among others, permeate each other. By a long line, for example intellect (Analytics, First Critique) and reason (Dialectics and Methodology, First Critique) and the power of judgement (Third Critique) are yoked together. If, starting out from something particular of which one has safe knowledge, something general is at first critically assumed, and if under certain conditions one may conclude on a general rule, then this is, Kant says, the hypothetical application of reason (First Critique) and, to have it more precisely, the reflecting power of judgement (Third Critique). Both terms describe a searching method. This searching – elsewhere in Kant also called zetetic – is at the heart of a kind of metaphysics which is scientifically grounded and works in an insight-extending way. Even if we are provided with principles, categories, conceptual knowledge and rules of logics, nothing will be achieved without experience, which must be added (First Critique B 165), and just the same absolutely nothing will be achieved without anticipating, hypothetical, regulative ways of proceeding. The Third Critique informs about the methodological value of expedience; this Critique makes use of aesthetics in the sense of methodology – which is why this book is not about the beauty of art but about the prudent re-valuation of the concepts of (transcendental) logics and the philosophy of science as they have established in the field of aesthetics.
However, only by way of somewhat dissolving from Kant´s individual works, which have in each case been researched in detail, and by taking the entire philosophical work as a whole we will be able to see and identify the particularities of the searching and finding line of thought, that is: of the hypothetical-deductive method and its performative features as a whole, and this means also: by its claim to being a philosophical system.
Even in Plato, the each respective starting point for a theoretical analysis or a dialogue consists of what is called <hypothesis> there. Also in Kant there are assumptions and positings which are then subsequently assessed and analysed; also there, as several times I have explained elsewhere, there happens a dialogue, and that is a dialogue with the readers.
In such contexts, hypotheses are not at all meant to be true or wrong; rather they have a crucial function for the process of learning and gaining insight. If later it turns out that a hypothesis, which has been used as the starting point e. g. for a certain discourse, proves to be untenable, inept, in a certain way to be a thing of the past after having been assessed and analysed, there is no need to forever put it to the scrap yard of philosophy with a shake of one´s head, and certainly we should not wish to have never been dealing with it: no, it will forever be part of the (staged in the case of Kant and Plato) learning process, and it belongs to a kind of border area which is the fringe of the field of the possibly safest knowledge.
Perhaps there will even come the day when one comes back to them, when they are going to be implemented once again and e. g. initiate further dealing with this idea.
The same holds for the use of certain rhetorical devices into which hypotheses may be clothed, such as: ambiguity or irony, also satire, mockery, parody. Insofar as they are used within a well-structured philosophical framework, and this is what we have in the case of Kant´s philosophy, they are always in the service of dealing with theories, they claim validity and knowledge. On the whole, such ways of proceeding save us from the idea that we might own the truth. On the whole, we should become and remain sceptics, which is not meant to say that at no time certain (preliminarily) ready-made, that is well-founded, insights and results are possible.
In view of Kant´s work I suggest to speak of a special kind of philosophical irony, because his incredibly ingenious rhetorical skills consisted of combining and mixing ironic and ambiguous passages with straight sentences in such a way that frequently he confronts his readers with challenges (which, however, can definitely be met). Because usually there are only very subtle forewarnings: be careful, this now is a statement which is actually improper; attention, there follow irony and mockery; better be careful, not all of what is going to follow has the same status or may rightly so claim to be of philosophical value, reading is laborious and frequently requires the reader´s consideration and reflection. Constantly we are called upon to distinguish: within which scope is a sentence, a statement, philosophically legitimate, that is: justified? Have I already considered all the criteria, or may it be that one aspect is still missing? Is it not that three years ago the author, in a different text, claimed something else? What was the value of the statement then? Against the background of the text I am currently facing, do I perhaps know more now about good philosophical answers to a question than before?
Often one is provided with important hints by being able to reveal that certain passages are indirect quotations and references e. g. to other authors. If one succeeds with this, soon one comes to understand that the sentences in question are of hypothetical value and that here Kant makes use of them not because of being historically interested but that they serve as a constrastive foundation for argumentatively securing his own philosophy.
Hypotheses and irony as typical features of Kant´s method, which covers his entire work, this I understand as an element of a way of considering things which may frequently appear by way of enigmas. Of course, it is not the author himself who tells these riddles, but they are part of the above mentioned dialogue with the readers. Thus, many passages in the overall work are enigmatic, and in this sense concepts and terms used in the context of these enigmas must be understood to be pre-terminological: they are tools for the discourse but are no ways of presenting final truths.
Why then, however, do humans quite obviously strive for truths instead of probabilities? What is the reason for this constant bossiness and the desire to beat and destroy the opponent – also and precisely in modern academic life? Why do we not appreciate hypotheses or models which have been refuted by way of experiment or studies to the same or at least a similar degree than those which have been confirmed by experiment? After all, it is clear that often we owe much to them.
One answer might be this one: because we do not think in a conditional but in an apodictic way. What has been achieved is supposed to be true in all eternity, independent of viewpoint. This person whose light is the brightest, that is what many people would like to be themselves, and this, combined with today´s common way of self-advertisement everywhere, results in certain attitudes being supported and in a certain way of behaviour, even in academic life.
We may believe to have left the dogmas behind, but no, they come back in disguise, and possibly they are even more significant than they have ever been, because now they no longer assemble around myths or images of God but, and this is even worse: they spoil the method at its roots. If then this method even bows to the ideas and demands of market economy thinking, a conditional idea of finding the truth and a much more radical possibility of how we might jointly progress thought and philosophising instead of continuously understanding ourselves as lone warriors retreats to the back. When it comes to third-party-funding, nothing is gained by refuting hypotheses, generally we are supposed to assume progress, please. Any way of sceptically questioning one´s own position is out of the question. If at all, this must happen in the dark but no way in public, as it would mean biting all those hands that we hope to somewhat safely feed us.
In the case of Kant´s philosophy, for more than one hundred and fifty years certain features of his works have been over-expounded – compared to the otherwise common distrust in the respectively discussed texts – by way of this over-expounding, in the context of research his texts have been and are still abused to make one´s own light shine brighter, by repairing the texts and by appropriately proving where Kant `was wrong´ at the same time one points out to one´s own brightness.
But I believe: that what sceptical philosophy is capable of, that is again and again asking itself, asking once again, checking back, and also being capable, with a degree of enthusiasm, of admitting that there are things one does not know or is not really sure about, in the sense of a cultivated method and in the sense of keeping distance and being humble towards oneself: this will be the task of humans in the future.
Instead of always pointing the finger at others while running the rat race for attracting as much media attention as possible, we might rather dedicate our thought to cultivating our own thinking, not least in the sense of putting our own positions into question. This is a more silent way, but quite certainly it is much more likely to make us all more human again.