How to learn thinking for yourself II
– The construction of a supra-temporal philosophical system

1. Sceptical details of the criticism of others: irony, mockery, satire  - 2. Sceptical overall-staging: the dramaturgy of the wide arcs  - 3. What happened with irony among the Romanticists? Concerning the sceptical details discussed under 1)  - 4. What happened with irony among the Romanticists? Concerning the wide arcs of philosophical works discussed under 2)  - 5. Concluding remarks

In the following it is going to be about judgements on Kant´s philosophy and method gained from insights into the overall context of Kant´s work. Here his work, which was basically published during his lifetime, is understood to be a dramaturgically and rhetorically planned, staged unity of one process of arguing, in the course of which a sceptically-assessing method is applied which is characterised by frequently operating at first with insufficiently determined traditional concepts and classifications, to then, in the further course of proceeding, specify and improve them or reject them completely. Any interpretation which assumes that during the intervals between his texts the author identified fundamental errors of his own thought and improved them accordingly is not able to recognize the thus applied rhetorical strategies.

If an author continuously presents texts over a period of fifty years, in any case it is at first plausible to assume that these may be connected to each other. If, to give evidence to such a connection, one relies most of all on historical sources, one is confronted with a problem: several of these sources are not clear in this respect; many passages in letters where Kant mentions the development of his own thought or his own senility and insufficient capability of thought may for good reasons be interpreted as being ironic, inauthentic – if we consider that such letters were written at times when, on the other hand, the author presented brilliant treatises, in my opinion they must be interpreted in this way. The same holds for passages of the texts themselves which are similarly different from each other: there, we must not be tempted to read certain statements the author seems to make about himself in the sense of diary entries – they are part of a well-composed whole, and in each single case one must start a search: does Kant allude to some other author or to the structure of his system? For, frequently in his texts we find statements in the sense of that `for the time being´ he is not capable of clarifying or solving this problem in every detail. I understand such statements in the sense of expressing the intention to deal with this issue or problem in the future, perhaps after certain concepts will have been analysed whose classification or definition is necessary for precisely this clarification. However, as in most cases Kant himself only indirectly, by way of allusions, announces or addresses this system structure as well as the texts which, in the context of this unity, are connected to each other, since the beginning of the 19^th century and given the fact that up to here primarily historicising premises are allowed for this kind of interpretation, it is assumed: in Kant there is no such successively worked out system structure, planned right from the beginning. For: he never mentioned it. Quod erat demonstrandum.

Instead, his various statements that something could as yet not been done or presented as well as the fact that throughout his entire work there is much topical movement when it comes to his theoretical statements as well as in the context of his analyses and the things under analysis are taken as evidence for the author´s continuous further development, who had constantly felt the need to correct his considerations and thus could always present a new text only after having made the appropriate improvements. This idea of gradual development is a basic paradigm of the 19^th century. I find it extraordinarily regrettable that still today one does not see any necessity to put this idea critically into question and to put it to the test. Things are similar when it comes to the related belief in progress in the humanities – in my opinion, a belief which is a serious obstacle for prudent thought and the inclusion of older authors.

Explaining the connection between the texts by poor thinking is not part of the perspective I take. If this was true, Kant would have passively been subject to some kind of outside influences and would in each case have adjusted the respectively current state of his writing to them. No, Kant laid out all steps of his proceedings and all texts and kinds of texts purposefully, all irritations and volte faces of his texts are staged strategies by way of which he pursues a multi-levelled plan. On the one hand, this plan has a philosophical-educational aspect which addresses his contemporaries: the readers were supposed to learn how to think independently; in Kant, revisions and considerations which are continued differently from earlier arguments are elements of his method, by way of which the readers are supposed to be made familiar both with topical and with methodological knowledge, indeed in a performative-methodological way. They are those who are guided through a line of thought and pushed into irritations from which they are supposed to find a way out either by help of the author (by reading later texts which solve certain riddles) or even quite independently. Kant´s whole work is based on a sceptical-discursive method which readers notice only if they do not, from a historical point of view, put themselves into a position which is superior to him and claim that constantly he had made mistakes.

For, Kant frequently discusses dogmatic approaches in a mocking or satirical way, particularly in his early texts. As concerns these, those interpreting him claim that, on the whole, they are as dogmatic as the texts by the traditional authors at whom Kant subtly mocks. Today, all over the world Kant is considered an author who, although applying the method of criticism and by claiming transcendental philosophy and criticising any dogmatic justification, is regrettably still halfway rooted in the dogmatic tradition.

This is an assumption which is due to wrong preconditions for interpretation. To overcome them, for once one must dare the test and accept the irritations and riddles as well as the whole staging, in short: accept the school of thought of one of the great sceptical thinkers in the history of philosophy.

The second aspect of the here sketched plan refers to the idea that such a performative-methodological way of proceeding was not meant for those living in Kant´s age, i. e. his contemporaries in the widest sense, but to this way of proceeding, and this is a most brilliant way of applying the idea of Enlightenment, aiming at the distant future and challenging the thought and learning how to think even of later generations. Kant is speaking to us when it comes to thinking through and discussing certain philosophical problems and the intertwined lines of reasoning. And this `us´ will still be true in two hundred or in one thousand years.

Indeed, if for once we let our eyes wander across the philosophy of the past generations in the West: hardly any other author has been dealt with as intensely as Kant. And why is this so? It is because of the many open questions in his work, because of the many theoretical and methodical issues which are precisely not timbered as ready-made doctrines. I would like to say: it is because the structure of his system is planned for the future of philosophically interested mankind, and this again means that, in my opinion, it is similar to Plato´s philosophy for which, by the way, also this is true: that open issues are essentially composed into it. We should understand this feature of a system which still has to be spelled out in more detail and whose elements still have to be demonstrated in detail to be an essential feature of sceptical thought. Otherwise, sceptical systems are rare in the history of philosophy; one would have to have a closer look at Gassendi´s or Diderot´s works, and I believe that then we would probably make finds. One thing, however, is true anyway: these open issues should absolutely be understood to be a staged openness (in Plato, in Kant) and thus to be prudent, philosophically meant elements of the whole, but not as flaws of a philosophical conception. It would be disadvantageous if philosophy, today and in the future, would only understand itself in the sense of a science which, concerning certain issues, intends to provide the world with doctrines. Such doctrines may be based on the best possible reason-giving, and their structure may be considered complete – but is this really what we mean by the fascination of philosophical thought? And is it really enriching if philosophers, by way of their doctrines, come at each other, with the intention of `beating´ the respective opponent? Philosophy is kept alive by questions, not primarily by answers, and certainly not by answers which are `not meant at all´ to be followed by questions. Furthermore, this is true for today and for the future: after all, after some time nobody will deal with such doctrines anymore. Who in our time does really thoroughly and in the context of exciting debates analyse the world according to Wolf or Baumgarten?

1. Sceptical details of the criticism of others: irony, mockery, satire

At many passages of his work Kant says that he does not want to teach philosophy but how to think, it is even said that philosophy cannot be taught at all. This given, the first question is: what is the difference between philosophy and philosophising? The second question is: how are we supposed to imagine the teaching of philosophy in the context of printed works – that is: it may be imagined that Kant makes his listeners actively think in the course of a lecture, but how is this supposed to be possible in the context of a printed work?

On the first question: philosophy may be defined as the sum of teaching and arguing as it was presented in the past and has been passed on, mostly in written form. This sum is historically existent and consists of the teachings and texts of the history of philosophy as the results of thought processes. Now, in the course of learning these results, during philosophy lessons, in the course of private studies, one learns how to also comprehend these thought processes. Does this not suffice? After all, also this way one learns how to think. Or does philosophising, in contrast to philosophy congealing to the result, mean learning how to produce such results? Then, is thus philosophy something like creative writing? Or does the nominalised verb philosophising simply mean arguing?

Now, it is well possible to learn how to argue if one studies texts from the tradition and reasons out their considerations. Thus, by reproducing these thoughts one would learn philosophy based on the historical theories of other people. It is also very well possible that in the course of doing so one will achieve one´s own answers, and then basically the only thing to be needed would be an instruction of how to reasonably formulate or write down one´s thoughts.

Thus, philosophising could be defined as the reconstruction of ideas presented by others while at the same time preparing counter-arguments and strategies of counter-arguing. Thus, philosophising and thinking would be skills which are trained by adopting the results of thinking and by the reconstruction of arguments. But: these skills would become valid only if there happens an interplay with considerations which are not part of what has been read and adopted. Even if what has adopted came from a discourse and thus already included arguments and counter-arguments, the capability of independent thought would not consist of being able to just reproduce them. Perhaps one might say: crucial for philosophising is supporting a spirit of resistance, supporting counter-arguments. If one intends such a kind of support by help of educational means, one must do more than just lecture on philosophical propositions for the record and for being learned at heart. It would be much more suitable, based on certain knowledge of subject and methods, to discuss certain positions by clarifying claims to validity by way of stating and accepting reasons.

In Kant, the teaching of how to philosophise can only refer to his printed works, as his lectures rather communicated knowledge contents without discussing claims to validity – at least if we are supposed to believe the existing sources. And indeed a printed text is no seminar or lecture. If, by the interplay of adopted and one´s own ideas, by the interplay of pro and con, the spirit of resistance is supposed to be strengthened, and this way independent thought is supported and thus there happens the teaching of how to philosophise, then there is the question: how could this be achieved by way of a printed text? The answer is: Kant achieves this in the course of several texts which are connected to each other. Doing so, he makes use of a variety of means, to teach the readers how to think, contradict, give reasons, and thus how to philosophise.

Supporting the spirit of resistance succeeds 1. by way of presenting the most various philosophical positions which in each case are not compatible with each other, and 2. by way of inserting mistakes which, in the following, are going to be called trap-mistakes. I argue that such trap-mistakes are very effective operators of a sceptical method. To reveal these mistakes, one must apply what one has learned immediately before. If this is successful, it demonstrates to the learner that he or she has understood the matter. Furthermore, incorrect `knowledge´ is still a significant element of the learning process and, when remembering the lessons and what has been learned, it stays to be an element of the delimitation from correct knowledge. Thus, this way of teaching is crucially congruent with methods of sceptical irony.

The effect of such a way of teaching is, firstly, that the students are confronted with a situation in which they are on their own and independent of anyone else, in other words: they must independently decide which statements by the teaching person are right and which are wrong. Nay, it is more: at first one must notice at all that there are wrong statements among what is said. Only if somebody is capable of making independent judgements, he or she has learned how to think independently. This, however, is the declared goal of the philosophy of Enlightenment. This should not be disregarded as a nice phrase – its meaning was extraordinarily radical. In Kant, furthermore, its composition was a genius stroke. I argue that he includes quite a number of such trap-mistakes into his texts. Usually they are not announced beforehand, and if, then only very indirectly. They may be classified as:

1. Wrong conclusions or, logically seen, extremely dubious derivations

2. Topical contradictions or even contradicting statements

3. Topical contradictions by way of grammatical references

4. Making use of insufficiently determined concepts while pretending that they are determined

The intended effect for reading, as I am convinced, is supposed to be somewhat like this: just a moment, no, this can´t be true! Just a few lines above, somewhere the opposite has been stated. Or: just a moment, fundamentally this can´t be really correct. As a reader, one is caught in a kind of dilemma or even an aporia: there are two contradicting or at least very incongruent aspects, and the author does not seem to provide me with anything that might help with solving the problem.

Understanding these kinds of `mistakes´ in Kant´s texts as purposefully included mistakes has, for the time being, not been an element of interpretation. Frequently one reaches back to explanations such as these: the typesetters and copy-editors of Kant´s texts did not delete mistakes having occurred in the course of the writing and copying process, and Kant, when checking the proof sheets, was careless enough to let them all slip through.

It is a fact now that, for the time being, there has not been any systematic analysis and categorisation of all the `mistakes´ throughout the complete printed works. Certainly, there happened mistakes in the course of typesetting and printing, and many of such printing errors are easily identified as such. And certainly, by far not all other `mistakes´ were meant for educational purposes, but in my opinion any more detailed judgement requires an exact list for a start as well as an attempt at a statistical assessment, instead of insisting on diffuse speculations about the sloppiness of the author and the flawed work of copyists, typesetters and printers.

2. The sceptical staging of the whole project: the dramaturgy or the wide arcs

Now, the initially mentioned fact that Kant´s philosophical work as a whole is one staged process of arguing, while applying a sceptical-assessing method which is frequently characterised by at first not operating with sufficiently determined concepts and classifications from the tradition, to then specify and improve or even completely reject it in the further process, shall be explained in somewhat more detail.

Firstly, it is crucial that Kant does not only pick up a few dubious trains of thought from the tradition, which he assesses and criticises in the process, but that, as is my thesis, for the sake of completeness he takes to task ALL approaches and theories from the stock of philosophical tradition. According to my interpretation, as explained elsewhere, this is the specific kind of Kantian `eclecticism´. Of course, such an inclusion requires certain space, and that is why usually Kant does not accommodate his discussions of the contents of certain issues in one text but distributes them across a number of texts.

Secondly, a dramaturgically intended sequence and movement through several contents over longer stages of the entire train of thought is laid out which may be understood as a kind of staging which is full of punchlines: the author creates a cathartic, surprising effect, at first building up tension along the train of thought and sometimes including several volte-faces and turnarounds of the philosophical considerations, which is then relieved, in a way, by presenting the final chord.

Doing so, at first Kant lays the foundations for the philosophical, conceptual analysis in line with the vocabulary and classifications presented by other authors (of the tradition or of Kant´s time) comparably loosely. Step by step, the knowledge of a topic and the knowledge of how such knowledge is to be gained are lashed together ever more tightly. Then there is no way back to the situation before certain achievements made by Kant´s derivations. Examples of the topics of such stagings by Kant throughout the entire printed work are: the thing-in-itself, the concept of freedom, the difference between the scopes of mathematics and philosophy, the distinction between subject and object, the concept of time, the concept of space, the causal principle, the concept of God, the ether, the analogy of the methods of natural science and of metaphysics, and others more.

The current difficulty of making such an interpretation of Kant´s complete works plausible is indeed not due to the work itself but to the interpretational habits of the past 200 years. Of course the various volte-faces of Kant´s train of thought were noticed even in the 19^th century – indeed this was why one reached back to the idea of the author having improved his thought – and indeed still today they are a subject of sometimes detailed analysis, and indeed it is based on that assumption of Kant having improved his thought. However, this would have to be objected: the common agreement of research is that his work must be structured into different periods (with different claims to validity being attributed to the different texts) and that his texts deal with different topics and disciplines, which again produces the result that the train of thought is only received within each respective text, even if it is to be found with wide parts of the overall work. Then, of course, one is no longer able to notice certain prudent turnarounds and cathartic effects of Kant´s system as a whole: either because one never reads late or early texts, or because, even if one reads them, one bases one´s own work on the historicising premise of the development of thought, thus making it superior to all other presuppositions, which way one may easily justify a focus on the texts from Kant´s middle period.

Concerning Kant´s conceptual work, such a staging across the printed works is connected to the insight that, as indeed Kant says himself, any prudent, methodically justified conceptual work can only happen disjunctively. Thus in some texts certain terms are used pre-terminologically. In such cases they are included into hypothetical arguments – which are usually indeed rhetorically identifiable as such – which is why at that time they were not “finished”. At first some further analysis must be carried out until a concept can be structured more satisfactorily or its meaning can be defined more satisfactorily. Now, however, some research works of the past dealt, in quite elaborate ways, indeed with such pre-terminological, hypothetical considerations by Kant, so that admitting their preliminary nature in the context of the complete train of thought might come along with the worry that one´s own research work might be devalued.

Thus, in Kant the reader is guided through the loops and along the threads of a variety of problems and arguments,[1] not knowing anymore if the author expresses himself hypothetically or, correctly, as a teacher results in developing an improved capability of judgement, so that irritating statements may considerably contribute to enlightening the readers. It is supportive and beneficial, Kant says,[2] if the reader is at first confronted also with unsuitable ways of proceeding, to effect active involvement in the respective thought.[3] That certain deliberations are meant as riddles is made explicit only immediately before they are solved. „Hier erklärt sich auch allererst das Räthsel der Critik, wie man dem übersinnlichen Gebrauche der Categorien in der Speculation objective Realität absprechen und ihnen doch in der Ansehung der Objecte der reinen practischen Vernunft, diese Realität zugestehen könne.“[4] Thus, by way of specified concepts[5] the Second Critique resolves issues which were left open in the First Critique, among others by deepening the causal theory. Frequently with the structure of the work we observe the method of open ends. That the reader is informed about the various positions and approaches of the tradition contributes to the emergence from self-imposed immaturity, just like the fact that in progressu his/her capability of judgement is improved and his/her own maturity of thought is supported by methods or irritation and mystification. Kant´s work is a walk through one line of reasoning. The sequence of the texts is somewhat like a sequence of chapters. Other than the chapters of a book, of course, these texts were not published at the same time. Their chronological distance from each other gives expression to philosophy being work, as Kant has it pointedly in Vornehmheit,[6] and it is like the distance which is to be found in Descartes´ Meditations, as an example of entering into a dialogue with oneself, or with Galilei´s Discorsi, as an example of one dialogue among others.

For, in Kant´s work there happens a dialogue, both between philosophical issues and, at the meta-level, between himself and the reader. The ongoing discussion of concepts and theories as well as their modifications and transformations produce the result that only the whole of the debate sheds light on the way of treating them in each respective context. Not always the titles indicate the content. Sometimes topics are not finished, whereas others are further dealt with. But the line of argumentation is always immediately continued. At the heart there is Kant´s dictum according to which it is not philosophy but philosophising which must be taught. The student `who has graduated from school´ believes that `he is going to learn philosophy which, however, is impossible, for now he is supposed to learn how to philosophise´.[7] The presented arguments often are no teaching content but allow for different views at a problem or an approach to a solution, which way it becomes possible to discuss methodical aspects apart from the topical issue.

For the assessment of the validity of essential concepts and arguments of the tradition, with due regard to the modus cognoscendi, the knowledge of a number of such modi is indispensable. Only if one´s own thought is completed by the capability of thinking in place of others, one will finally achieve the consequent mode of thinking.[8] In view of the latter, Kant combines his philosophy as well as the composition of his work with legal processes, i. e. with non-bindingly and unprejudiced listening to certain points of view as it is common at court.

In line with this was already e. g. the scholastic culture of academic disputations, which demanded each disputant to at first state the position of the opponent, before he was allowed to state his own objections. Then the possible solutions had to be compared. This `characterises both the scholastic method of reasoning and the medieval court practice´.[9] Since the 12^th century, by using insolubilia, jurists practiced such a dialectic method at court.[10] In the First Critique Kant emphasises the latter´s significance in the context of an analogy to philosophy. The image of court proceedings is most important also for the work as a whole.[11]

Current circumstances may affect certain aspects of the work structure, but they are no conditiones sine qua non for the line of argumentation. It may thus be that calls for proposals or current events influenced the sequence of dealing with certain issues, the outer appearance or the dates of publishing,[12] but this does not hold for the way of arguing as such. The texts have several functions, apart from continuing the line of argumentation these are e. g. the communication of propositions, such as in Metaphysics of Morals, or that of a review respectively a reply. The most important reviews and replies are Review of J. G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity Part II, Determination of the Concept of a Human Race, On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be made superfluous by an Older One, On the Common Saying: That may be correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice, On an Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy, Settlement of a Mathematical Dispute founded on Misunderstanding, Proclamation of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treaty of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy. It may be that extraneous circumstances limited the planning and preparation of texts. From 1758 to 1762, Kant only published announcements of lectures.[13] At that time, during the Seven Years War,[14] publications were difficult because then the Russian occupational force was in charge of administration and censorship in Prussia, however with the exception of the censorship of academic publications, which remained with the university.[15] Thus, publishing in the form of announcements of lectures meant that any trouble with another interested authority could be avoided.

Longer periods of working out a topic, postponed dates of publication, reactions to current texts or events[16] as well as accumulated publications at certain points in time show that in certain respects the process of realizing the train of thought was dynamic. The accumulation of publications at the beginning of the 1760s may be explained by the occupation, during which these texts were worked out but, for reasons of volume alone, could not be published in the context of announcements of lectures.[17] The ways in which the texts were worked out was oriented at their function for the work as a whole, in which way also certain remarks by Kant must be understood, and that is in the systematic sense, not in the sense of a chronological date, such as that a work had been `caused by that doctrine of doubt by Hume´.[18]

Many issues and concepts are dealt with repeatedly across the overall work. In view of the work as a whole, many texts at the same time function as `summa and continuation´,[19] so that repetitions are an important element of the procedure. Later texts are comments on, completions of and solutions for what has been said earlier. For example, in the context of the sublime Kant discusses the effect of war on society and his aesthetic judgement,[20] later followed by the ethical judgement,[21] including several modi cognoscendi and having the first approach followed by a comment and a solution. Also Georg Cavallar states on this: `There are not two different kinds of “Kant” but just one who, however, comes to different judgements on one and the same subject, each according to point of view.´[22] Accordingly, in the course of the step by step way of arguing of the overall work, many texts are open-ended because not all modi cognoscendi are taken into consideration at the same time.[23] Again and again Kant writes that certain issues are `not yet´ dealt with.

Frequently the presentation of new aspects is realised dramaturgically, such as when the deduction of the moral law in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is at first continued, by the surprising aspect of the facticity of freedom in the Second Critique, as something which is `quite absurd´ and `replaces this vainly seeked deduction´.[24]

Opus postumum concludes the work,[25] however without taking up again those topics which were finally dealt with in the texts of the years 1797-1800;[26] in terms of methodology the text connects to the First and Third Critique as well as to Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.[27] The `manifoldness of the phenomena´, it says, shall be constituted by reason to a whole `not from experience, empirically, but for the sake of experience, a priori´.[28] Doing so, Kant in his older days is not, as Nicolas Rescher believes, `the one commenting on young Kant´.[29] Rather, the conclusion of the work is the capstone of the wide arc spanning across the work as a whole. Opus postumum, as Ernst Cassirer had it, shows `some harsh clarity and immediacy which sheds a clear and sometimes unexpected light on Kant´s earlier ideas´, and it provides topical `information of a certainty and sharpness one would vainly look for in the earlier works´.[30] To conclude the work, the systemacity of a philosophy which is structured according to a scientific, critical method is concluded and confirmed by several threads of the sometimes hypothetical thoughts now being brought together to form an entirety which is also oriented at the integration of mechanistic and teleological theories on nature. That in this document Kant so frequently writes about a `transition´ does not contradict the idea of a conclusion but confirms it.

3. What happened to sceptical irony among the Romanticists? Referred to ironic details in philosophical texts

As also explained in the text on Romantic irony, many authors from the period after Kant, in Europe, show a fondness of theoretical subjects which are somewhat related to different kinds of `sublimity´ as well as of absolute scientific `seriousness´ and, when it comes to their own theorisations, a strong rejection of the means of satire, mockery, ridiculousness and irony.

A fundamental problem by the end of the 18^th century and the beginning of the 19^th century might have been that philosophical irony was basically connected to the character of Socrates and not to Plato as an author.[31] If one just considers the ironic ways of proceeding to be found in the context of Plato´s dialogues, and that is against the background of rather negative judgements, as they were due to the opinion of Aristotle and others, one may possibly overlook strategies of philosophical, that is sceptical, irony as they become obvious, among others, by the strategy of wide arcs e. g. of Plato´s philosophy as a whole, or: as they provide the basis for the latter. Then one will not be able anymore to understand that these strategies pursued a superior purpose, that there existed a philosophical whole for which irony was just one element out of several. This whole is dedicated to researching and striving for philosophical insight, for conceptual clarity, for methodological profundity, and generally: for the best-possible acuteness of mind. In this context, of course also the distribution is crucial: quantitatively seen, usually the share of irony will be clearly smaller than the share of non-irony.

Due to its devaluation in Aristotle, the European concept of irony has come to be equated with “dissimulatio”, with pretence and deception. The Romanticists and early Romanticists considered irony almost exclusively from this point of view and considered it `intellectual arrogance, arbitrariness, the disdainful ignoring of fundamental emotions of mankind, in short: a kind of annihilating scepticism´.[32] `In the wake of Hegel´s far-reaching influence, his critique had a negative influence on the definition of irony far into the 19^th century.´[33]

For several reasons its philosophical significance fell into oblivion, and its scope was ever more limited to the belles lettres. What `seems to characterise the range of irony is its strange mixture of wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance, these contradictions permeating each other to such an extent that they form a whole´,[34] such as in Erasmus´ “Praise of Folly” (Laus Stultitiae) or in Cervantes´ “Don Quijote”. In combination with mixing the narrative level with the level of listening, irony gains its compositional significance, particularly in the novels of 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe. `One masterpiece of this kind is the novel “Tristram Shandy” by Laurence Stern´.[35]

A closer and critical look reveals this: The change of meaning which led to the total loss of sceptical irony for philosophical methods, as it is mirrored by today´s common understanding, is basically due to the way of thought of just a few individuals of the 19^th century, and they are Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Solger, Hegel and Kierkegaard. Across several ages they so much disparaged grown, ambiguous irony of expression and in the context of composing texts which sometimes even subversively worked against censorship, to such a degree and with so much effect that today one is just barely able to raise the awareness at all of the meaning and the methodological usefulness of sceptical irony. Either irony is understood to be a stylistic means of making-look-ridiculous or it is connected to tendencies – which were usually also considered to be no longer worth striving for – towards obscure, indistinct thought as it was obviously pursued by many Romanticists. In 1964, Vladimir Jankélévitch writes in L´ironie:[36] `Beyond the alternative between HUMOUR AND SERIOUSNESS´, the `Romanticists envisaged a metaphysical region which would be that of Coincidentia oppositorum´.[37] They were passionately looking for a beyond of the comical and the tragic, this undifferentiated kind of chaos´ and labelled it as the “abyss”, as “wisdom” or as “absolute identity”. `We all know the Romanticists´ preference of Shakespeare, of Cervantes, of all those who maintain imagination by the ambiguity of the sublime and the burlesque´.[38] In Friedrich Schlegel, the laugh to be found there is called “logical chemistry”, in Novalis it is called “spiritual electricity”, in Jean Paul it is called “the anagram of nature”.[39] One refers the contrary, which is in each case the rhetorical stylistic subject, to playfulness/seriousness, laughing/crying, tragic/humour, identity/contradiction, being/nothing – but never to: logic, reflection, the definition of terms, the assessment of methods, or to teaching others how to think.

4. What happened to sceptical irony among the Romanticists? Referred to the sceptical staging of the whole and the dramaturgy of the wide arcs

The 19^th century is also the century of historicism. Striving for scientificity, the interest in method, and the carefulness of the search for sources and of their research, all these are achievements to be connected to historicism. Yet still, this must be stated: precisely when starting out from the orientation of historicity at objectivity, it may happen that a researcher reduces all kinds of texts to sources to which he/she attributes the same status.

Now, if by way of “I” an author makes statements on “him/herself”, in a philosophical treatise they will certainly have a meaning which is different from that of a diary. The problem of historicity-oriented philosophical interpretations is: if texts include irony or metaphorical speech without explicit announcement, one will not necessarily notice this if one exclusively applies methods of historical research which are oriented at the goal of “objectivity”. To notice this, one would require certain hints which complete the sounded out sources by additional information which in these sources themselves is not easily identified. Then, however, there is the question of how much historical insight and the analysis of sources depend on interpretation. Obviously, simply relying on a historical document – without additional instructions of how the contents to be immediately identified with this source must be understood and interpreted – does not allow for gaining any reliable historical insight.

Such self-reflection and perhaps even self-criticism was no quality to be found with historians in the 19^th century. After all, they believed that because of their careful striving for objectivity in the context of their own work such trouble was ruled out. Historicity did in principle not provide for any reflection of one´s own attitude or perspective, because it was believed to be fundamentally unnecessary.

Thus, in the context of the above sketched rejection of irony and of propagating the progress of thought, which was also due to Hegel´s thought, one was striving towards times of an absolute objectivity of dealing with historical matters (which was supposed to replace the up to then common story-telling), and certainly one was also of the opinion that it would be better to leave behind the satire which had been common in the past as well as the common mockery which was common with texts from the Renaissance – for what about objectivity if one mocks and satirises?

As it is also discussed elsewhere, when it comes to the history of ideas we may rightly so attest the 19^th century to have been dominated by a bone dry, deadly serious and stubborn spirit striving for being right, which frequently made fruitful philosophical debates impossible, for: nobody was able and willing to accept any criticism. Nobody was able or willing to admit that sometimes it is better to refrain from judgement (as Kant so frequently demands in his work), at least as long as it takes to present better insight or evidence.

In this spirit of intransigence and dogmatism, combined with an almost cult-like adoration of “objectivity” as the goal of all scientific work, during that century the people of Europe increasingly separated themselves from the pioneers of Enlightenment, from a friendly struggle for the better argument, from being tolerant towards dissidents, and from any readiness for critically reflecting on oneself.

5. Concluding remarks[40]

Hidden references pose a challenge to any interpretation, particularly if the texts are ambiguous or characterised by polemics and satire. Given this, to which `methodical equipment´ could we reach back to not interpret a text wrongly? Concerning this, Heinrich Meier discusses in view of Rousseau´s work: `The best method we know to achieve an appropriate understanding and a consistent interpretation […] is pursuing the hints, the allusions and the cross references the author provides us with, […] to not prematurely dismiss something as just a figure of speech or a superficiality, […] and to at first not considering any accidentally used phrase an accident. If a book has been written carefully, careful reading will not allow for any arbitrary interpretation.´[41] Also in Kant´s work we find many hidden references, and constantly the adoption or rejection of the various theories and concepts is linked to each other. Over the course of the work, the deciphering of allusions and hidden meanings is in each case provided for by the later texts. This holds also for Kant´s final text, Opus postumum, which resolves several doubtful cases which have developed in the course of his work and consequently sharpens them in terms of transcendental philosophy. Now, there is no doubt that Kant meant this text to be published – however, due to its critique of religion, this text would, in much probability, have been refused the imprint. Thus, we must take into consideration that Kant meant this text to be published at a later time, after his death and after certain resentments would have been generally overcome. Thus, it would have been meant as a publication in the sense of a temporary non-publication. At an age when one had to watch out for the censors, not least to protect one´s own existence, this would certainly have been a prudent solution. It may be that today we are not able to really adequately understand how much the authors of those days were actually under pressure to think and write in secrecy. If one was forced to deceive the contemporaries about one´s true ideas, one had to write texts which were clearly suitable for convincing the readers that the contrary was meant. In the case of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) this was somewhat successful.

`The public considered Reimarus a champion of religion […]. Only very few had an idea of what he really thought about religion as it was revealed´.[42] To be able at all to interpret Reimarus´s Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion in zehn Abhandlungen auf eine begreifliche Art erkläret und gerettet […][43] as an ambiguous text, it is necessary to read Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes or Fragmente eines Ungenannten,[44] published by Lessing, and only in retrospect from there it is possible to judge on certain contents. In my opinion, this is also true both for Kant´s work as a whole and for the concept of Kant´s work as a whole. And also in the case of Kant we may imagine certain strategies to protect his existence;[45] also in Kant´s case only the final text reveals a much more radical thought than in most texts in the course of his entire work.

When attempting, based on new presuppositions and guidelines for understanding and interpreting, to present Kant´s work as a whole, one must attribute functional aspects to each text which can only be considered a `system´ if we assume them to be such a whole. Inevitably, this idea alone is a goodbye to any historicising, chronology-based interpretation in the sense of later texts depending on a gradual development of the author´s thought. We must instead assume planning and conceptual decision-making during periods preceding (sometimes perhaps much earlier) those periods when the author presents us with ready-made theories. Thus, in terms of method we enter the realm of speculation, however on the whole this approach at an interpretation is, firstly, worthwhile and, secondly, it can be made plausible given certain matters of course of the thought of Enlightenment and early Enlightenment (the significance of rhetoric, the value of eclecticism; the closeness of systems philosophy to encyclopedean thought) – even more so if one states that in the 19^th century these matters of course were no longer recognized as such. If those who, in terms of methodology, still today crucially influence the interpretation of Kant come indeed from that post-Kantian century, and if they were indeed no longer capable of noticing at all enthymematic, alluding presentations and references to positions and debates of the tradition as such, then the first thing to be done is to critically tear apart this interpretation history. Instead of turning the incapability of the 19^th century authors to recognize certain features of the work structure into stating that these features were non-existent at all (because they cannot be proven by help of the methods of these authors), it is very reasonable and desirable that for once the presuppositions of this history of interpreting Kant are put into brackets and instead some revisions are taken into consideration.